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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Decision-Making Difficulty in Major Depression:
Understanding Indecisiveness and the Role of Expected Affect
by
Haijing Wu Hallenbeck
Doctor of Philosophy in Psychological and Brain Sciences
Washington University in St. Louis, 2020
Professor Renee J. Thompson, Chair
Decision-making difficulty is a prevalent symptom among individuals with major depressive
disorder (MDD). Decision-making difficulty has been found to be pervasive across different
areas of decision-making in current MDD; however, its exact nature for some areas (e.g.,
indecisiveness) is not well characterized, and the extent to which it is a scar of MDD is not
determined. Furthermore, affective disturbances (e.g., in expected affect) have been theorized to
contribute to decision-making difficulty in MDD, but empirical studies are needed to test this
theory. In my two-study dissertation on depression, Study 1 focused on the dimensionality and
validity of indecisiveness, and Study 2 focused on the link between disturbances in expected
affect and decision-making difficulty. In Study 1, I administered self-report questionnaires of
indecisiveness and of depression and a behavioral task of indecision to an online sample of
adults (n = 602). I found evidence of a two-factor model corresponding to indecisiveness and
decision-making confidence; indecisiveness was strongly positively associated with depressive
symptoms and with situational indecision. In Study 2, I used ecological momentary assessment
(EMA) to evaluate expected affect for the outcomes of anticipated decisions and subsequent

viii

decision-making difficulty for these decisions (i.e., whether anticipated decisions were made) in
the daily lives of people with current depression (n = 48), people with remitted depression (n =
80), and healthy controls (n = 87). I found that higher expected negative affect characterized the
current depressed group, although there were no group differences in decision-making difficulty
or in the association between expected affect and decision-making difficulty. Findings from both
studies refine our understanding of decision-making difficulty in MDD, highlighting the
importance of indecisiveness as an area of decision-making difficulty (Study 1) and highlighting
the possibility that anticipated decisions in daily life are not associated with decision-making
difficulty (Study 2). In terms of affective disturbances, heightened negative affect surfaced in
both studies as part of the decision-making process and would be worthwhile to target in future
research on factors that contribute to decision-making difficulty. Furthermore, findings from
both studies inform the design of future studies, shedding light on how the assessment of
indecisiveness can be improved (i.e., by excluding items related to decision-making confidence;
Study 1) and on how EMA studies can more strongly elicit decision-making difficulty as well as
assess for potentially important moderators to help elucidate the complexity of decision-making
in daily life (Study 2). Although decision-making difficulty in MDD was not reflected in making
daily decisions, addressing other aspects of indecisiveness (e.g., longer decision-making times)
in the context of existing treatments for MDD may help to alleviate symptoms and enhance
overall quality of life and functioning for depressed individuals.
Keywords: depression, decision-making, affect, indecisiveness
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General Introduction
Decision-making difficulty is a symptom of major depressive disorder (MDD; American
Psychiatric Association, 2013). The symptom is prevalent among diagnosed individuals,
affecting over half of patients with MDD (Mitchell, McGlinchey, Young, Chelminski, &
Zimmerman, 2009). Moreover, it has been found to negatively influence treatment outcomes,
even after accounting for initial depressive severity (Uher et al., 2012). There is some evidence
that it is a risk factor for (Hein et al., 2003), as well as a scar of (Nierenberg et al., 2010), MDD.
Given that decision-making difficulty characterizes many people with MDD and influences the
course of the disorder, it is critical to understand the nature of decision-making difficulty in
MDD and which factors contribute to this difficulty.
To better understand the nature of decision-making difficulty in MDD, I completed a
review of the depression and decision-making literature (Hallenbeck & Thompson, 2019). This
review covered five research areas of decision-making, which were chosen because they were
the most commonly studied in the context of depression: indecisiveness, decision-making under
uncertainty, intertemporal choice, social decision-making, and effort-based decision-making. I
operationalized decision-making difficulty in depression as patterns of decision-making that (a)
showed differences from healthy controls (for current or remitted MDD studies; e.g., Pulcu et al.,
2015) or varied systematically with depressive symptoms (for studies assessing depression
dimensionally; e.g., Maddox, Gorlick, Worthy, & Beevers, 2012); and (b) resulted in negative
outcomes, which could be subjective (e.g., reporting that decision-making is difficult; Rassin,
Muris, Franken, Smit, & Wong, 2007) or objective (e.g., resulting in less money or fewer points
earned during behavioral tasks; Murphy et al., 2001) in nature. I found that extensive decisionmaking difficulty characterize those with current MDD. In fact, there was evidence of difficulty
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in MDD for each area of decision-making reviewed (see Table 1 for a summary of the findings
from Hallenbeck & Thompson, 2019).
Among the five research areas of decision-making reviewed, some of the strongest
evidence of decision-making difficulty in MDD involved indecisiveness. Indecisiveness is
defined as the tendency to experience difficulty making decisions across multiple life domains
(e.g., career, relationships, health; Rassin, 2007). Despite the consistent empirical support for
increased indecisiveness among those with MDD, the area lacks a strong model of which
features compose indecisiveness and has conflicting findings for whether indecisiveness
represents a unidimensional or multidimensional construct. Moreover, the area relied heavily on
the use of self-report questionnaires to assess indecisiveness, which can only gauge one’s
perceptions of the tendency to be indecisive. Relying on this method alone is problematic for
assessing people with MDD, who are prone to negative biases in recalling their experiences
(Gotlib & Joormann, 2010). I addressed these limitations in Study 1 of my two-study
dissertation. More specifically, the two aims of Study 1 were to investigate the dimensionality of
indecisiveness (Aim 1) and to test its associations with depression and with a behavioral measure
of indecision (Aim 2). Behavioral measures of in-the-moment decision-making can complement
and help to validate self-report questionnaires of indecisiveness, as well as broaden our
understanding of indecisiveness in depression.
In the same review, I developed a model of decision-making difficulty in MDD that
accounts for factors that may contribute to the difficulty (see Figure 1 for the model from
Hallenbeck & Thompson, 2019). In formulating the model, I drew upon decision frameworks
that emphasize the role of affect in decision-making; these frameworks have become
increasingly popular in a field that traditionally viewed decision-making as a predominantly
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cognitive process (Lerner, Li, Valdesolo, & Kassam, 2015). In my view, affective factors needed
to be underscored in the model, because affect disturbance is at the core of MDD, which is
encompassed in the cardinal symptoms of sadness and anhedonia. I proposed that multiple
affective factors could lead to decision-making difficulty in MDD, including current affect (both
related and unrelated to the decision at hand), as well as expected affect (for each of the decision
options under consideration). Expected affect, in particular, is thought to represent the subjective
value of decision options, about which people base their decisions (Mellers, 2000). Alterations in
expected affect, including lower positive affect (PA) and higher negative affect (NA), may
interact with other factors (e.g., negatively biased attention) to contribute to decision-making
difficulty in MDD (Hallenbeck & Thompson, 2019).
Preliminary evidence suggests that depressive symptoms are associated with expecting
lower PA and higher NA for decision options under consideration (Pietromonaco & Rook,
1987). When considering the affective forecasting literature, which involves expectations for the
future more broadly, the same pattern of findings holds for people with current and remitted
MDD in comparison to healthy controls (Thompson et al., 2017; Wu et al., 2017). Because these
alterations in expected affect characterize both current and remitted MDD, they could represent
more trait-like effects as scars of MDD—that is, emerging during an episode and enduring even
after the episode is remitted (Burcasa & Iacono, 2007).
In comparison, it is not clear whether decision-making difficulty is similarly trait-like in
MDD; it is possible that decision-making difficulty is state-dependent (i.e., occurs only during an
episode). Whereas decision-making difficulty in current MDD is extensive across different areas
of decision-making, the evidence for decision-making difficulty in remitted MDD is mixed (i.e.,
with both positive and null findings) and difficult to interpret because the limited studies
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available focus on different areas of decision-making (Hallenbeck & Thompson, 2019).
Additional research is needed to further clarify decision-making difficulty in remitted MDD.
Because alterations in expected affect (i.e., lower PA and higher NA) are consistent
across current and remitted MDD, but decision-making difficulty may only apply to current
MDD, the hypothesized link between expected affect and decision-making difficulty may not
hold for remitted MDD, as it likely would for current MDD. Moreover, although researchers
have highlighted the role of expected affect in decision-making difficulty in MDD (Hallenbeck
& Thompson, 2019), they have not specified the mechanism by which expected affect may
contribute to decision-making difficulty. Alterations in expected affect may represent an issue of
low motivation to make decisions (the motivation hypothesis) or an issue of discriminating the
value between different decision options (the discrimination hypothesis), resulting in decisionmaking difficulty. In Study 2 of my dissertation, I investigated the link between expected affect
and decision-making difficulty for decisions in everyday life and compared three groups—those
with a current depressive disorder (i.e., current depressed group), those with a depressive
disorder in full remission (i.e., remitted depressed group), and those with no current or past
mental health disorders (i.e., healthy control group). The first two aims tested group differences
in expected affect (Aim 1) and decision-making difficulty (Aim 2). Aim 3 examined whether
there were group differences in the association between expected affect and decision-making
difficulty and tested two competing hypotheses of motivation and discrimination.
Study 1
Introduction
Indecisiveness has been defined as the tendency to experience difficulty making
decisions across multiple life domains (e.g., career, relationships, health; Di Fabio, Palezzeschi,
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Asulin-Peretz, & Gati, 2013; Germeijs & De Boeck, 2002; Osipow, 1999; Rassin, 2007).
Increased indecisiveness has been associated with impairment and distress in everyday
functioning (e.g., reflected in interpersonal difficulties, lower self-esteem and quality of life;
Ferrari, 1994; Germeijs & De Boeck, 2002; Taillefer, Liu, Ornstein, & Vickers, 2016) and is part
of the broader symptom of decision-making difficulty in MDD. However, perhaps because its
definition is so broad, investigators have designed a myriad of self-report questionnaires to
assess indecisiveness. Some of these questionnaires assess the construct broadly (Cooper, Fuqua,
& Hartman, 1984; Frost & Shows, 1993; Germeijs & De Boeck, 2002), whereas others have a
particular focus, such as emotions (Elaydi, 2006) or behaviors (Potworowski, 2010) related to
indecisiveness, or a particular style of indecisiveness (i.e., exploratory versus impetuous;
Bacanli, 2006). Moreover, when considered individually, the questionnaires that broadly assess
indecisiveness miss important features of the construct that are described in the main theory on
indecisiveness (Rassin, 2007). Factor analyses on these questionnaires have provided mixed
evidence on whether indecisiveness is a unidimensional or multidimensional construct (Germeijs
& De Boeck, 2002; Spunt, Rassin, & Epstein, 2009). Before more progress can be made on
understanding indecisiveness in the context of depression, clarity is needed on which features
compose indecisiveness and on whether indecisiveness is best understood as a unidimensional or
multidimensional construct.
In terms of which features should comprise indecisiveness, the two most well-validated
and widely used questionnaires broadly assess indecisiveness through a wide range of features
(e.g., relating to thoughts, emotions, and behaviors). Importantly, the features assessed by these
questionnaires are represented in the main theory on indecisiveness (Rassin, 2007). These two
questionnaires have the same name, the Indecisiveness Scale; I will distinguish them by the
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following notations, the IS-FS (a 15-item scale; Frost & Shows, 1993) and IS-GDB (a 22-item
scale; Germeijs & De Boeck, 2002). The IS-FS was created for use in populations with
obsessive-compulsive tendencies and the IS-GDB for use in career counseling. Items from the
IS-FS and IS-GDB have high internal consistency. Both the IS-FS and IS-GDB show good
convergent and discriminant validity in student and community samples. For example, both are
positively associated with self-reports of decision-making difficulty in specific life domains
(Frost & Shows, 1993; Germeijs & De Boeck, 2002), as well as with neuroticism but not with
extraversion (Di Fabio & Palazzeschi, 2012; Germeijs & Verschueren, 2011). Of note, the IS-FS
has been revised to exclude four domain-specific items (e.g., “I do not get assignments done on
time because I cannot decide what to do first”), which was found to be more parsimonious and
argued to be more conceptually sound than the original scale (Rassin et al., 2007).
The content of the revised IS-FS and IS-GDB is partially overlapping. The two
questionnaires assess several common features including: perceiving decision-making as
difficult; taking a long time to make decisions; delaying decisions; avoiding decisions; worrying
about decisions; and regretting decisions made. Each questionnaire contains unique features as
well. The revised IS-FS assesses lacking confidence for making decisions and having anxiety
about making decisions, whereas the IS-GDB assesses not knowing how to make decisions,
leaving decisions to others, and changing decisions, resulting in each measure excluding
important features of indecisiveness. The absence of a single questionnaire that comprehensively
assesses indecisiveness has contributed to the unknown nature of the dimensionality of
indecisiveness. In order to thoroughly evaluate indecisiveness as a construct, it would be
important for future investigations to consider features included in both the revised IS-FS and ISGDB.
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The only two studies investigating the factor structure of indecisiveness have divergent
findings. In addition to looking at different questionnaires, they used different analytic methods,
which poses another barrier to understanding dimensionality. Germeijs and De Boeck (2002)
found that the IS-GDB was best characterized by a one-factor model, using a principal
component analysis (PCA). PCA is better suited for data reduction rather than for determining
the factor structure of a latent variable, however (e.g., Costello & Osborne, 2005). In contrast,
Spunt et al. (2009) found the revised IS-FS was best characterized by a two-factor model, with
aversive and avoidant indecisiveness as the two factors. Aversive indecisiveness was defined as
“a generalized aversion for decisions that manifests as threat-oriented cognition and negative
affect when making decisions” and included items related to worry, anxiety, and regret about
decisions; avoidant indecisiveness was defined as “a generalized motivation to avoid decisions
and to experience difficulties making decisions” and included items related to perceived
difficulty and behaviors such as taking a long time to make decisions and delaying decisions.
This two-factor solution was reached through an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) followed by a
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), the latter of which is regarded as a strong, theory-driven test
of factor structure (e.g., Brown, 2015).
Therefore, existing research indicates that there are at least two possibilities for the
dimensionality of indecisiveness. That is, indecisiveness is a unidimensional construct (Germeijs
& De Boeck, 2002) or a two-dimensional construct, corresponding to aversive and avoidant
indecisiveness (Spunt et al., 2009). However, I think that a third possibility is that indecisiveness
is composed of three dimensions that correspond to cognitions (e.g., perceived difficulty),
emotions (e.g., anxiety and regret), and behaviors (e.g., taking a long time to make decisions).
Although it has not been tested empirically, this possibility stems from the main theory on
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indecisiveness, in which features of indecisiveness were conceptualized as falling under these
three categories (Rassin, 2007). In fact, some researchers have focused on examining only one of
these indecisiveness categories, as was the case for Elaydi (2006) in examining emotions and for
Potworowski (2010) in examining behaviors. Future research on indecisiveness would benefit
from testing models based on both prior empirical work and theory, as well as using rigorous
analysis methods for investigating factor structure (e.g., CFA; Brown, 2015).
In contrast to the traditional models above that test for multiple specific and correlated
factors, bifactor models test for specific factors that account for unique variance above and
beyond a general factor that corresponds to shared variance among items (Holzinger &
Swineford, 1937). Complementing traditional investigations of dimensionality, bifactor models
may be particularly valuable to run for questionnaires with heterogenous content (Reise, Moore,
& Haviland, 2010; Reise, Morizot, & Hays, 2007), and researchers have more frequently begun
to incorporate them to shed light onto the utility of using specific factors versus a general factor
of a questionnaire by comparing the unique versus common variance explained, respectively
(e.g., Brouwer, Meijer, & Zevalkink, 2013; Chen, Hayes, Carver, Laurenceau, & Zhang, 2012).
If the variance accounted for by the general factor exceeds 60% of the total variance, the items
are considered to still reflect a single construct, despite some dimensionality in the data (Reise,
Schienes, Widaman, & Haviland, 2013). Researchers have also used bifactor models to help
account for method variance. For example, in efforts to see whether reverse-scored items belong
in a questionnaire assessing social anxiety, Rodebaugh and colleagues included two methodrelated factors (i.e., one factor corresponding to straightforwardly worded items, and one factor
corresponding to reverse-scored items) in their bifactor models (Rodebaugh, Woods, &
Heimberg, 2007; Rodebaugh, Woods, Heimberg, Leibowitz, & Schneier, 2006). If such a

8

bifactor model fit well and its method-related factors do not correlate highly with substantive
factors of interest (e.g., as part of evaluating convergent or discriminant validity), one could
conclude that method-related reasons are driving factor structure findings.
Although there is no consensus on the dimensionality of indecisiveness, the relation of
indecisiveness to depression has been studied. There is consistent evidence indicating that
depression is associated with increased indecisiveness in both clinical and nonclinical samples,
as assessed via self-report questionnaires. Depressive symptoms have positively correlated with
scores on both the original and revised IS-FS (Di Schiena, Luminet, Chang, & Phippot, 2013;
Lauderdale, Martin, & Moore, 2019; Rassin & Muris, 2005; Rassin et al., 2007); the IS-GDB has
not been used in the study of depression. Depressive symptoms have also been associated with
scores on three questionnaires tapping specific features of indecisiveness, although these
questionnaires were not designed to assess indecisiveness per se. More specifically, depressive
symptoms have been positively associated with delaying decisions and leaving decisions to
others (Di Schiena et al., 2013; Leykin & DeRubeis, 2010; Radford, Mann, & Kalucy, 1986;
Shirren & Phillips, 2011; Umeh & Omari-Asor, 2011); regret about decisions (Leykin &
DeRubeis, 2010; Schwartz et al., 2002); and avoiding decisions, “brooding” and anxiety about
decisions, and lower confidence for making decisions (Leykin & DeRubeis, 2010). Studies
comparing people with clinical MDD and healthy controls show convergent findings (Alexander,
Oliver, Burdine, Tang, & Dunlop, 2017; Bruine de Bruin, Dombrovski, Parker, & Szanto, 2016).
Most research examining indecisiveness, including studies on depression, has used selfreport questionnaires. Self-report questionnaires assess a person’s perceptions of the tendency to
be indecisive across situations and require a person to retrospectively recall his or her decisionmaking experiences. This may be particularly problematic in the context of MDD, in which there
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are well-documented negative biases in memory (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010); such biases could
lead depressed individuals to over-report their indecisiveness. Research using self-report
questionnaires could be bolstered by behavioral approaches that assess in-the-moment decisionmaking, which can include the assessment of self-reported decision-making experiences as well
as an objective measurement of time needed to make decisions. Because behavioral approaches
are constrained to studying specific decision situations, they are thought to assess indecision,
which is conceptually related to but distinct from indecisiveness (Di Fabio et al., 2013; Germeijs
& De Boeck, 2002; Osipow, 1999). That is, indecision is specific to a situation, whereas
indecisiveness generalizes across situations. Career indecision, for example, has been found to
represent a separate latent variable from that of indecisiveness, and the two were positively
correlated and also showed discriminant validity (i.e., there was a stronger association between
indecisiveness and self-esteem than between indecision and self-esteem; Germeijs & De Boeck,
2002). Of note, the assessment of indecision has also primarily been self-report; including an
objective measurement of time for decisions made in-the-moment would be a more
comprehensive approach to assessing indecision. Such an approach would help to validate selfreport questionnaires of indecisiveness, which has thus far been done sparingly and using
hypothetical decisions (e.g., Frost & Shows, 1993).
Further, a more ecologically valid approach to assessing indecision would be to use
decisions with real (or perceived to be real) consequences rather than hypothetical decisions. The
only study to date to take this approach asked participants to make decisions about an upcoming
task in which they would be working with a partner, and participants were given the opportunity
to read information about the decision options prior to making their decisions (van Randenborgh,
de Jong-Meyer, & Hüffmeier, 2010). Dysphoric (versus nondysphoric) participants reported
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lower decision confidence and had longer decision times as expected, although there were no
group differences in reported decision difficulty, as would be expected based on previous
indecisiveness research on depressed samples (e.g., Rassin et al., 2007).
Future research on indecision can build on the original van Randenborgh et al. (2010)
study in two ways. First, because participants read information about decisions as part of the
indecision task, it would be important for studies using the task to rule out verbal IQ as a
potential confound for decision time; lower verbal IQ may lead to longer reading times which, in
the context of this task, might look on the surface like additional time was needed to make
decisions. Second, indecisiveness was not assessed in their study, so it is not clear how their
indecision outcome measures (i.e., decision-making difficulty, confidence, and time) relate to
indecisiveness. Past research suggests that a two-way association exists between indecisiveness
and indecision (e.g., Germeijs & De Boeck, 2002); that is, those higher in indecisiveness are
more likely to show indecision for any given decision, and those who show more indecision
across decisions are more likely to self-report as higher in indecisiveness.
In the present study, I administered the two self-report questionnaires that broadly assess
indecisiveness (i.e., the revised IS-FS and the IS-GDB), a self-report questionnaire assessing
depressive symptoms, the behavioral decision-making task by van Randenborgh et al. (2010) that
assesses indecision, and the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale third edition (WAIS-III;
Weschler, 1997) vocabulary subtest (as a proxy for verbal IQ) to a large sample of adults
recruited online through two crowdsourcing platforms, Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) and
Prolific Academic (ProA). Because these platforms are able to provide diverse samples of the
U.S. population, including diversity in age and race/ethnicity, findings from studies have the
benefit of being more generalizable than student samples. Extant research has primarily
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compared these online samples to student samples and found that online samples still maintain
the quality of the data and allow for large samples of participants to be recruited (Buhrmester,
Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Peer, Brandimarte, Samat, & Acquisti, 2017). Given that my study
assessed depressive symptoms in an online sample, it afforded the opportunity to evaluate
depression dimensionally across varying demographics and to understand more intricately its
associations with indecisiveness and indecision through having a large sample size.
Aim 1 of the present study was to investigate the dimensionality of indecisiveness. I used
CFA to compare six factor structures of indecisiveness: (1) one-factor model; (2) two-factor
model (i.e., aversive and avoidant); (3) three-factor model (i.e., cognitive, affective, and
behavioral); and the corresponding bifactor models for the (4) two-factor (i.e., aversive and
avoidant) and (5) three-factor (i.e., cognitive, affective, behavioral) models; and (6) a bifactor
model with two method-related factors (i.e., corresponding to items from the revised IS-FS
versus IS-GDB). Although the two-factor model has some evidence in its favor (Spunt et al.,
2009), none of the other models have been tested through CFA (or tested at all), so I treated the
first five models as competing hypotheses and the sixth model (i.e., testing method-related
factors due to questionnaire source) as a possibility to rule out. The use of both indecisiveness
questionnaires and a theory-driven analysis approach should help to more conclusively answer
the question of dimensionality.
Aim 2 of the present study examined the relations among depression, indecisiveness, and
situational indecision. I think that the direction of causality is such that depression causes
indecisiveness and indecision because they are part of the broader symptom of decision-making
difficulty in the disorder. In addition, I think that the direction of causality for indecisiveness and
indecision is bidirectional. However, because the use of CFA alone cannot test causal
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associations, I hypothesized that depressive symptoms, indecisiveness, and indecision will be
positively associated with one another; furthermore, I hypothesized that these associations would
hold after accounting for the effect of verbal IQ on indecision. Importantly, depressive symptoms
were expected to be positively associated with indecisiveness, regardless of its factor structure.
Although depression and indecisiveness have thus far been examined in a piecemeal fashion in
the literature, depressive symptoms have been reliably associated with a wide range of
indecisiveness features; this would likely mean that depression will be related to indecisiveness
regardless of how those features end up grouping together. Finally, because indecision in this
study was assessed in-the-moment and included an objective assessment (i.e., decision time), a
positive association with indecisiveness would help to validate indecisiveness as a construct. A
positive association with depressive symptoms would help to clarify the nuances of decisionmaking difficulty in depression; that is, it would show that this decision-making difficulty is
represented in-the-moment as well as through a general tendency, and that the difficulty is both
subjective and objective in nature.
Method
Participants
Participants (n = 301) were first recruited online from MTurk from July 2019 to
November 2019. Due to technical challenges with MTurk, online recruitment was switched over
to ProA, which has been found to produce data similar or higher in quality to MTurk (Peer et al.,
2017). Participants (n = 301) were recruited from ProA from November 2019 to February 2020.
The final sample from both platforms included 602 participants, with an average age of 35.44
(SD = 10.99) years and with a relatively equal representation of gender (50.2% male). Inclusion
criteria were: 18-77 years of age, living in the U.S., speaking English as their primary language,
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and having at least a 98% approval rate for completion of previous studies. An additional
inclusion criterion was having immediate access to headphones/earphones and a computer web
camera, which was necessary for the believability of the indecision behavioral task (see
Materials below). Exclusion criterion was failure to pass one comprehension and two attention
checks embedded in the study, resulting in automatic termination of the study (see Procedure
below). A total of 57 people (n = 40 from MTurk, n = 17 from ProA) were excluded from the
study for failure of a comprehension/attention check and were not included in the final sample of
602 participants.
Additional demographic information for the final sample is presented in Table 2. The
MTurk and ProA samples did not significantly differ in age and income level (ps > .16).
However, the MTurk and ProA samples differed significantly in gender (p = .006); a higher
percentage of women were intentionally recruited in ProA to end up with roughly equal
percentages of men and women in the total sample. The samples also differed significantly in
race/ethnicity composition (p = .002), such that the MTurk sample had a higher percentage of
Black/African American participants, whereas the ProA sample had a higher percentage of
multiracial participants or participants listing their race as “Other.” The two samples also
differed significantly in highest educational level (p = .03), such that the MTurk sample had a
higher percentage of participants with a graduate or professional degree, whereas the ProA
sample had a higher percentage of participants who had some college experience.
I used the Monte Carlo method (Brown, 2015; Kline, 2011) to conduct a priori power
analyses for determination of sample size. This method involves bootstrapping, that is,
specifying population values for all parameters (e.g., factor loadings, error variance), and then
from this population, randomly sampling data of a specific sample size to compare the resulting
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average model parameters to the population parameters. The closer the model parameters are to
the population parameters, the less bias there is. According to Muthén and Muthén (2002), a
specific sample size is thought to be sufficient when: 1) the bias of the model parameters and
their standard errors does not exceed 10% for any parameter in the model; 2) for model
parameters that are the specific focus of the power analysis, the bias of their standard errors does
not exceed 5%; and 3) the coverage (i.e., the proportion of replications for which the 95%
confidence interval contains the true population value) is between .91 and .98. In addition, the
statistical power (i.e., the proportion of replications in which the parameter is significantly
different from zero) of the parameters of focus should be .80 or higher (cf. Cohen, 1988).
To come up with a conservative estimate of target sample size, one of the more complex
statistical models was used as the basis of the Monte Carlo power analysis. This model assumed
that indecisiveness was represented by three factors (i.e., cognitive, affective, and behavioral;
Model 3 in Figure 2), which were each correlated with separate factors of depression and
indecision, which were correlated with each other. For the population values, all factor loadings
and correlations between factors were set at .4, to represent relatively weak associations. The
results of the power analysis revealed that a sample size of 600 participants was mostly
adequately powered to detect significant effects: For all parameters, biases and standard error
biases were ≤ 6.2%, coverage values were = .92-.94, and statistical power was ≥ .99; moreover,
for parameters of interest (i.e., the associations among the three factors of indecisiveness,
depression, and indecision), most standard error biases were ≤ 5%, with the exception of a few
biases that were just above 5% (with the highest at 6.2%, for the correlation between the
cognitive indecisiveness factor and indecision).
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Due to an oversight, depression in the above power analysis model was modeled as a
single factor with all 20 CES-D indicators when it should have been modeled as a higher-order
factor with four lower-order factors onto which indicators loaded (see rationale in Analysis Plan
below). A post-hoc power analysis of the final model resulting from Aim 2 revealed that the
sample of 602 participants was still adequately powered to detect significant associations
between the main factors of indecisiveness (i.e., straightforwardly worded and reverse-scored
factors), depression (higher-order), and indecision (one-factor). For these main associations,
parameter biases and standard error biases were ≤ 2.8%, coverage values were .94-.95, and
statistical power was = 1.00. Estimates were similarly good for factor loadings of the
indecisiveness and indecision factors, as well as the four lower-order depression factors loading
onto the higher order depression factor. However, estimates were poor for the factor loadings of
the individual four lower-order depression factors, with coverage values as low as 0 and
parameter biases as high as 24.8%; although they were not ideal, these estimates were still
acceptable, as the goal of the study was not to study associations with the lower-order depression
factors but rather to examine associations with the higher-order factor of depression only.
Procedure
Eligibility procedures differed slightly between the MTurk and ProA platforms. MTurk
participants were directed to Qualtrics to answer eligibility questions (i.e., age, gender, country
of residence, primary language, and access to headphones/earphones and web camera). ProA
participants did not complete eligibility questions on Qualtrics because ProA handles study
eligibility within the platform. That is, ProA only displays studies to participants when they fit
researchers’ specified inclusion criteria. If they met inclusion criteria, both MTurk and ProA
participants provided informed consent and completed the main portion of the study in addition

16

to remaining demographic questions (including age, gender, race and ethnicity, education, and
income) on Qualtrics.
The main portion of the study involved indecisiveness, depression, indecision, and
verbal IQ measures administered in a randomized order across participants. To address concerns
that studies from crowdsourcing platforms have been contaminated by low-quality responses
driven by bots (i.e., Internet robots; Bai, 2018), one comprehension check and two attention
checks were included; failure of any one check resulted in automatic termination from the study.
Occurring during the indecision task, the comprehension check gauged how well participants
were paying attention to and understanding the instructions. More specifically, after instructions
about the indecision task were presented, participants were asked to write a brief open-ended
response about what they were being asked to do; acceptable responses included something
about making decisions. Occurring during the indecisiveness and depression self-report
measures, the two attention checks asked participants to select a certain rating (e.g., “Please rate
this item as Strongly Disagree (0). This is an attention check.”).
MTurk participants who passed the comprehension/attention checks and completed the
study were compensated $1.50; ProA participants who passed the checks and completed the
study were compensated $1.65. Because the study was expected to last approximately 15
minutes, this corresponded to a compensation rate of at least $6.00/hour. The payment differed
between the two platforms because ProA requires all studies to have a minimum compensation
rate of $6.50/hour. Additionally, a total of 15 participants won a $5 e-gift card to Target or
Walmart, as part of the indecision task (see Measures below). MTurk participants completed the
study in an average of 381.45 minutes (SD = 1468.29, min = 7.93, max = 10051.28); however,
after outliers representing unusually long durations (i.e., greater than 1000 minutes, perhaps due
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to inactivity on Qualtrics; n = 23 or 7.6% of the total MTurk sample) were excluded from
duration calculations, the average was 18.45 minutes (SD = 7.52, min = 7.93, max = 55.00).
ProA participants took a similar amount of time to complete the study, with an average of 19.84
minutes (SD = 9.34, min = 7.65, max = 111.48); the difference between the two groups was
marginally significant, t(577) = -1.96, p = .05. This protocol was approved by the Institutional
Review Board at Washington University in St. Louis.
Measures
Indecisiveness. To assess indecisiveness, I administered two self-report questionnaires.
The first self-report questionnaire of indecisiveness was the revised IS-FS (Rassin et al., 2007;
Spunt et al., 2009). It has 11 items (six reverse-scored) that are answered on a 5-point scale (1 =
strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). These items have been shown to have good internal
consistency (αs = .86-.88; Rassin et al., 2007; Spunt et al., 2009); in my sample, internal
consistency for all of the items was also good (α = .88).
The second indecisiveness questionnaire I administered was the IS-GDB (Germeijs & De
Boeck, 2002), which has 22 items (11 reverse-scored) that are answered on a 7-point scale (0 =
strongly disagree, 6 = strongly agree). Germeijs and De Boeck (2002) chose reverse-score the
negatively-worded items, so that lower overall scores indicated higher indecisiveness. I,
however, reverse-scored the positively-worded items so that higher overall scores indicate higher
indecisiveness, which is more conceptually straightforward and parallel with the scoring for the
revised IS-FS. The items from the IS-GDB have been shown to have high internal consistency (α
= .91; Germeijs & De Boeck, 2002); in my sample, IS-GDB items also had high internal
consistency (α = .94). Because the IS-GDB was developed partly based on the IS-FS, there are
four items with almost identical wording. Table 3 contains a complete list of items from both
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questionnaires and indicates which items are reverse-scored and similarly worded. Importantly,
items from both questionnaires had good coverage of the aversive and avoidant factors (Spunt et
al., 2009) as well as the cognitive, affective, and behavioral factors that were investigated (see
Table 3 for details).
Depressive symptoms. I assessed depressive symptoms using the Center for
Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (CES-D; Radloff, 1977). The CES-D was developed for
use in the general population rather than for use in clinical populations; subsequent research
confirmed that the CES-D performed better than another popular depressive symptom
questionnaire, the Beck Depression Inventory (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979), in the
general population (Skorikov & Vandervoort, 2003). The CES-D has 20 items (four reversescored) that ask about a range of symptoms (e.g., “I had trouble keeping my mind on what I was
doing”) and emotions (e.g., “I felt sad”) experienced over the past week. The items are answered
on a 4-point scale (0 = rarely or none of the time, 3 = most or all of the time). Higher scores
indicate greater depressive symptoms, with scores of 16 or greater representing those at risk of
having clinical depression (Radloff, 1977). Of note, the CES-D does not have an item assessing
decision-making difficulty; thus, positive associations between depressive symptoms and
indecisiveness or indecision will not be driven by items similar in content. Items from the CES-D
have been shown to have good internal consistency (α = .85; Radloff, 1977); in my sample, the
items had high internal consistency (α = .94).
Indecision. I assessed indecision using the behavioral task designed by van Randenborgh
et al. (2010). In this task, participants are asked to make four decisions (randomly presented)
about “the next part of the study,” which never occurs but serves to provide the impression that
they will soon experience the consequences of their decisions. For each of the four decisions,
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participants must choose between two options, about which they can first view up to 15 pieces of
information (for each option). Pieces of information about the two options are presented in
alternating order and are presented one-by-one, advanced by participants; which of the two
options presented first was counterbalanced (i.e., some participants viewed information about
Option A for the first, third, fifth, etc. pieces of information, whereas other participants viewed
information about Option B for the first, third, fifth, etc. pieces of information). After the first
three pieces of information are presented, participants can choose to end viewing information
and to make the decision at any time; if participants view all 30 pieces of information, they are
asked to make their decision at the end.
The four decisions concern: 1) the role to assume in the next part of the study, given that
they would be working with a partner (i.e., whether to play a more dominant or submissive role
that would correspond to being a boss or employee, respectively); 2) the task to work on (i.e.,
whether to work on improving the organizational problems of a hospital or on improving the
busy and stressful schedule of a sales manager); 3) the additional reward they would be entered
into a raffle for (i.e., which of two cafes they prefer a gift card for); and 4) an aversive stimulus
they would be exposed to (i.e., a mildly unpleasant sound or taste). Upon debriefing, all
participants indicated that they thought the “next part of the study” would happen (van
Randenborgh et al., 2010); thus, they likely believed that their decisions had real consequences.
This task has three outcome measures for each of the four decisions: decision-making
difficulty (self-report), decision-making confidence (self-report), and decision-making time
(objective measurement). Decision-making difficulty and confidence are assessed immediately
after each decision is made. Decision-making difficulty is assessed with the item, “The decision
was difficult.” Decision-making confidence is assessed as the average of three items: “I am
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confident that I made the right decision,” “My strategies for decision making were adequate,”
and “I feel competent to put the decision into action.” All four items are rated on a 7-point scale
(1 = not at all, 7 = very much). In the original paper (van Randenborgh et al., 2010), the three
decision-making confidence items were found to have at least sufficient internal consistencies
across the four decisions (αs = .69-.83); in my sample, the internal consistencies of the items
were good (αs = .87-.91). Decision-making time was recorded as the total time spent viewing
pieces of information for the decision.
Of note, this task was adapted for my study in two ways. First, the task was published in
German only. Thus, the 30 pieces of information for each of the four decisions were translated
into English. To do so, I used translation guidelines for adapting measures for cross-cultural
research (Guillemin, Bombardier, & Beaton, 1993; Sousa & Rojjanasrirat, 2011). These
guidelines specify using multiple translators for each stage of the translation process: doing
initial translations from the source language (German) to the target language (English), doing
back-translations from the target language (English) to the source language (German), and
coming to a consensus on the final versions of the items in the target language (English). Fluent
in both German and English, four advanced graduate students in the Psychology and German
departments at Washington University in St. Louis served as the translators. Second, the task was
adapted for online administration to people from a broad geographic distribution. To this end,
three decision options were modified, along with their corresponding pieces of information. Two
of the options were from the reward decision: Instead of presenting participants with the decision
of which of two local cafes they would like a gift card, I presented participants with the decision
of which retailer, Target or Walmart, they would like a $5 e-gift card (for which they were
entered into a raffle with a 1 in 40 chance of winning). The remaining option was from the
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aversive stimulus decision: Instead of being administered an unpleasant taste, participants were
presented with the option of looking at an unpleasant photo; the other option of listening to an
aversive sound was not modified.
To ensure that the English translations and modified decision options were comparable to
the original task (van Randenborgh et al. (2010), pilot testing in a sample of participants (n = 29;
a separate sample from n = 602 in the main study) was conducted on MTurk. I followed the same
pilot testing procedures that the authors used to validate the original task. After completing the
modified task (i.e., making the four decisions), participants rated the valence of the pieces of
information for each decision option on a 7-point scale (-3 = negative, +3 = positive). Similar to
what the authors of the original task found, the mean valence of the two options within a decision
did not differ between each other for all four decisions, ts(28) < 1.43, ps > .16, and neither of the
two options within a decision was chosen more often than the other, 2s(1) < 2.80, ps > .10. The
mean valence of the reward decision options and aversive stimulus decision options were
positive (M = 1.11, SD = 0.80) and negative (M = -0.24, SD = 1.43), respectively. Participants
likely believed that their decisions had real consequences because the majority (75.9%) indicated
that they thought that the partner task would occur. A copy of the four decisions and the
corresponding pieces of information for each option is included in the Appendix.
Verbal IQ. The WAIS-III vocabulary subtest (Weschler, 1997) was used as a proxy for
verbal IQ as has been done in previous studies (e.g., Muhtadie, Akinola, Koslov, & Berry
Mendes, 2015). Participants were given four minutes to define 26 vocabulary words. Each
definition was scored as a 0, 1, or 2, for a total composite score with a range of 0 to 52. The
scoring was performed by three undergraduate research assistants, SH, MT, and RS, who had
weekly group meetings with me to discuss discrepancies and/or questions. SH and MT coded
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data for the first 45 participants, and SH and RS coded data for all remaining participants. Each
pair of research assistants established reliability on practice data, then coded data from the same
participants for a brief period of time (as a way of refining reliability), and finally coded data
from different participants. Across the 26 vocabulary words, the interrater reliabilities for both
pairs of raters were high (average kappa = .92 for SH and MT; average kappa = .87 for SH and
RS). Internal consistency of the items was also good (α = .77).
Upon coding, the research assistants and I noticed patterns in the data that suggested: 24
participants (22 MTurk; 2 ProA) likely cheated by including in their vocabulary definitions
direct copies of text in online dictionaries or Wikipedia; 14 participants (all MTurk) likely did
not put forth a genuine effort to define the vocabulary words, evidenced by nonsense responses
(e.g., entering random numbers for all vocabulary words, entering the vocabulary word itself for
all vocabulary words); 6 participants (all MTurk) likely did not understand task instructions and
instead seemed to have provided word associations rather than definitions. Additionally, 19
participants (18 MTurk; 1 ProA) did not provide definitions on any vocabulary words. As a
result, WAIS-III data were not available for a total of 60 MTurk participants and 3 ProA
participants.
Analysis Plan
I calculated descriptive statistics, which included evaluating missingness and whether
there were significant differences on measures between MTurk and ProA participants, using
SPSS Statistics for Macintosh (Version 25.0; IBM, 2017). I used Mplus Version 8.3 (Muthén &
Muthén, 1998-2017) to run CFA analyses for both aims of the study. Because my measures
involve self-report ratings on a Likert-type scale (with the exception of decision time from the
indecision task), the models were fitted with the robust weighted least squares estimator
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(WLSMV), which is optimal for categorical data and can also accommodate continuous data
(Brown, 2015). WLSMV is capable of handling non-normal distributions of frequencies of data
in different categories (i.e., of different Likert-type ratings). Because WLSMV uses pairwise
deletion for missing data, the total percentage of missing data and the percentages of missing
data by primary variables of interest (i.e., indecisiveness, depressive symptoms, and indecision)
were calculated. If the percentage of missing data in a dataset is under 5%, it is not expected to
produce significant biases in the model estimates (Schafer, 1999). In addition to being a
covariate, verbal IQ was not evaluated for missing data in the same way as the primary variables
of interest because missing values for individual items from the WAIS-III vocabulary sub-test
are considered to be true missing values (i.e., the participant did not know the definition for the
vocabulary word). The vocabulary sub-test composite score was used as a single-indicator
covariate in the Aim 2 model (see Aim 2 details below).
To address Aim 1, which was to investigate the dimensionality of indecisiveness, I ran
CFAs to test six measurement models of indecisiveness. Diagrams of these models are shown in
Figure 2, and the hypothesized item-factor pairings for the two-factor and three-factor models
(and the corresponding bifactor models) are indicated in Table 3. For the two-factor model, item
designations for aversive and avoidant indecisiveness were copied over from the CFA in Spunt et
al. (2009) on the revised IS-FS; these designations, along with the definitions for aversive and
avoidant indecisiveness provided by Spunt et al. (2009), were used to parse items from the ISGDB into these two factors, which was a straightforward process. For the three-factor model,
due to the lack of an existing CFA, I used as a guideline descriptions of cognitions, emotions,
and behaviors from the indecisiveness theory by Rassin (2007) to categorize the items: “deciding
is perceived as difficult” and “not knowing how to decide” were examples of thoughts; “feeling
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uncertain during deciding” and “regretting decisions made” were examples of emotions; and
“deciding takes a long time” and “changing decisions” were examples of behaviors. I also
considered delaying or avoiding decisions, as well as relying on others for decisions, as
behaviors. Two types of items stood out to me as difficult to designate, because they could fall
under either the cognitive or affective factor: worrying about decisions and thinking that one
made the wrong decision. Ultimately, I chose to designate these as loading onto the affective
factor because they are often associated with anxiety and regret, respectively. Additionally, in the
CFA by Spunt et al. (2009), these items loaded onto the aversive factor with items related to
negative affect, rather than onto the avoidant factor with more general thoughts such as “I find it
easy to make decisions (reverse-scored).” In all six CFAs, error variances between identical or
similarly worded indecisiveness items (e.g., the item “I find it easy to make decisions” is in both
the revised IS-FS and the IS-GDB) were allowed to correlate.
To determine the best-fitting model, I considered the following incremental and absolute
fit indices: χ2 test of model fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999); the comparative fit index (CFI; Bentler,
1990); and the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI; Bentler, 1990); the root mean square error of
approximation (RMSEA; Steiger, 1990); the standardized root mean square residual (SRMR; Hu
& Bentler, 1999). A good model fit is indicated by: a small non-statistically significant χ2 test of
model fit, CFI/TLI values ≥ .95 (Hu & Bentler, 1999), RMSEA value ≤ .06, and SRMR value ≤
.08. However, one caveat is that the χ2 test of model fit is often statistically significant for large
sample sizes and should not be meaningfully interpreted as the model not fitting the data well,
especially if other fit indices are good. Researchers have also expanded goodness-of-fit
guidelines to include values that suggest adequate or acceptable fit: CFI/TLI values between .90
and .95 (Bentler, 1990) and RMSEA value between .06 and.10 (Browne & Cudeck, 1993;
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MacCallum, Browne, & Sugawara, 1996). If appropriate, relative model fit between models was
assessed using χ2 difference tests.
In the event that none of the models fit well, potential explanations were investigated.
One potential explanation is that certain items do not load highly onto factors across all models.
This might be more likely for items on the IS-GDB rather than the revised IS-FS, which was
revised based on weak item loadings (Rassin et al., 2007). The IS-GDB has one item with a weak
loading (i.e., item 20; “After making a decision, I can’t get it out of my mind”) based on a PCA
(Germeijs & De Boeck, 2002). It is possible that removing this item, or others that show weak
loadings, would improve model fit. Another potential explanation is that all of the
straightforwardly worded items load onto one factor, and all of the reverse-scored items load
onto another factor; this can be tested in a bifactor model with two method factors (similar to the
sixth model proposed). I did not think that this will be the case, because there was a balance of
straightforwardly worded and reverse-scored items in each of the two factors (i.e., aversive and
avoidant) from Spunt et al. (2009)’s CFA, but it would have been worth investigating if the
proposed models do not fit well.
To address Aim 2, which was to examine the relations among indecisiveness, depressive
symptoms, and indecision, I used CFA. A diagram of my hypothesized model is shown in Figure
3. Indecisiveness was modeled based on the best-fitting measurement model from Aim 1.
Depressive symptoms and indecision were modeled based on knowledge from existing literature.
With regard to depressive symptoms, the CES-D has been reliably shown to have a four-factor
structure, with factors corresponding to depressive affect, positive affect, somatic symptoms, and
interpersonal problems (Shafer, 2006); more recent research indicates that higher-order and
bifactor versions of the four-factor model also fit well (e.g., Gomez & McLaren, 2015). Because
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my aim was to test associations with overall depressive symptoms and not with individual
factors, I chose to model depressive symptoms through a higher-order model—that is, a higherorder factor of depression (to which associations with indecisiveness and indecision were tested)
under which there were four lower-order factors with CES-D items as indicators. With regard to
indecision, the creators of the behavioral task did not seek to comprehensively assess indecision
or test its factor structure (van Randenborgh et al., 2010). They found, however, that the exact
decision situation (out of four) did not reliably impact the three outcome measures of decisionmaking difficulty, confidence, and time, and they chose to average these outcomes across the
decision situations for their main mediation analyses. I decided to take a similar approach in
modeling indecision; that is, I averaged decision-making difficulty, confidence, and time across
the four decision situations and used these three averages as indicators loading onto indecision as
a single factor.
Model fit for Aim 2 was evaluated using the same global fit indices above. In the event
that the Aim 2 model did not fit well, parceling was considered to develop a more parsimonious
and better-fitting model. Due to the possibility of producing biased estimates in the model,
parceling may be most appropriate for unidimensional constructs (Bandalos, 2002; Little,
Cunningham, Shahar, & Widaman, 2002). After a well-fitting model for Aim 2 was obtained,
verbal IQ was added as a covariate to the model, to see whether the hypothesized associations
with indecision still held. To conserve statistical power, the composite WAIS-III vocabulary
score was specified as a single indicator of verbal IQ, with an error variance = 16.32 (calculated
from sample variance = 70.95 and α = .77). Indecision was regressed onto verbal IQ, which
effectively partialled out the effect of verbal IQ from indecision. All other correlations among
indecision, depression, and indecisiveness were the same as in the main model.
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Next, the final models for both Aims 1 and 2 were evaluated for localized areas of strain,
as part of further model diagnostics. Global fit indices alone cannot indicate specific places in the
model where there may be ill fit. To evaluate localized areas of strain, residual correlations
among indicators and modification indices for model relationships were inspected. There are
recommended cutoffs for identifying areas of strain (e.g., .10 for non-standardized residual
correlations and 10.0 for modification indices), but both residual correlations and modification
indices tend to be inflated by large sample sizes. As recommended by Brown (2015), I instead
sought to identify values that represented outliers (i.e., values that were extreme relative to the
other values).
Lastly, because this study recruited participants from two different crowdsourcing
platforms (MTurk and ProA), a multiple-groups CFA was run to evaluate measurement
invariance for the final model in Aims 1 and 2. As recommended by Brown (2015), the sequence
of steps for multiple-groups CFA is as follows: 1) Test the CFA model separately in each of the
two groups; 2) Conduct the simultaneous test of equal form (i.e., identical factor structure); 3)
Test the equality of factor loadings; 4) Test equality of indicator intercepts; 5) Test equality of
indicator residual variances; 6) Test equality of factor variances; 7) Test equality of factor
covariances; and 8) Test equality of latent means. These steps involve imposing progressively
restrictive constraints; if the model does not fit well in one of these steps, the procedure is halted
and the results are interpreted accordingly. If the full sequence of steps is completed, the model
can be said to be fully measurement-invariant between the two groups.
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Results
Descriptive Statistics
In the dataset with primary variables of interest (i.e., indecisiveness, depressive
symptoms, and indecision), the total percentage of missing data was 0.2%. Broken down by
measure, the percentage of missing data on the revised IS-FS (indecisiveness) was 0.3%, the
percentage of missing data on the IS-GDB (indecisiveness) was 0.2%, the percentage of missing
data on the depression measure was 0.4%, and the percentage of missing data on the indecision
task was 0.02%. Because these percentages were well under 5%, the WLSMV estimator using
pairwise deletion was not expected to produce biased estimates.
Mean composite scores and standard deviations for all measures are presented in Table 4.
When evaluating the total sample, mean composite scores for the two indecisiveness
questionnaires, revised IS-FS and IS-GDB, as well as for the verbal IQ measure, fell around the
mid-point of the full range of scores possible. The mean composite score on the depression
questionnaire was slightly above the clinical cut-off point, indicating that the participants as a
group may be at higher risk for clinical depression than the general population. Together, the
mean composite scores and standard deviations across these measures suggest good range and
variability of scores in the sample.
For the indecision task, the mean self-report ratings of decision-making difficulty and
confidence and the recorded decision-making time are displayed for each of the four decisions as
well as averaged across the four decisions in Table 4. Their means and standard deviations
indicate that participants erred on the side of finding decisions to be relatively easy to make and
that they were fairly confident in their decision-making; the majority of participants took under a
minute on average to make each decision. To investigate whether the exact decision made (out of
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four decisions) had an impact on decision-making difficulty, confidence, and time, a repeated
measures ANOVA was run. Decision-making difficulty, confidence, and time all differed
significantly based on the decision (ps < .001). Post-hoc tests using the Bonferroni correction
revealed that the differences were primarily driven by the reward decision differing significantly
from the three other decisions, with participants reporting lower decision-making difficulty and
higher decision-making confidence and taking less time to make the reward decision (ps < .001).
In addition, participants reported higher decision-making confidence for the aversive stimulus
decision compared to the role and task decisions (ps< .05); participants’ decision-making times
for the four decisions all differed from one another (ps < .01). No other pairwise comparisons
were statistically significant.
Comparing between the two sample sources, the MTurk and ProA samples had
significantly different mean scores on all measures with the exception of the IS-GDB
(indecisiveness) (p = .28). Compared to MTurk participants, ProA participants had significantly
higher revised IS-FS (indecisiveness) scores (p = .02), significantly lower depression scores (p =
.02), and significantly higher verbal IQ scores (p < .001). For the indecision task outcomes,
difference tests were run for the averages across decisions only; compared to MTurk participants,
ProA participants generally found decisions easier to make (p < .001) but had lower confidence
in their decisions (p = .02) and took longer to make decisions (p < .001). The multiple
differences between the two samples highlight the need to run multiple-groups CFA to test for
measurement invariance of the final models resulting from Aims 1 and 2.
Aim 1 CFAs for Indecisiveness
Fit indices for the six measurement models for indecisiveness are presented in Table 5.
The first five measurement models were conceptualized as competing hypotheses: the one-factor
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model, the two-factor model (with avoidant and aversive factors), the three-factor model (with
cognitive, affective, and behavioral factors), the bifactor version of the two-factor model (with
avoidant and aversive factors), and the bifactor version of the three-factor model (with cognitive,
affective, and behavioral factors). Unfortunately, none of these five measurement models met
criteria for acceptable model fit on any goodness-of-fit index (i.e., CFI, TLI, RMSEA, SRMR).
The sixth measurement model was a bifactor model with one factor representing items from the
IS-FS and the other factor representing items from the IS-GDB. This model only met criteria for
acceptable model fit on one goodness-of-fit index (i.e., SRMR).
Given that none of the six measurement models for indecisiveness fit well, two
alternative explanations were explored as planned. First, factor loadings for the three nonbifactor models (i.e., the one-factor, two-factor, and three-factor models) were examined to see
whether there were certain items with weak loadings onto factors across all of the models, in
which case they could be removed and the models re-tested. This did not appear to be the case,
as all standardized loadings for all three models were ≥ .5. Second, a bifactor model with one
factor representing straightforwardly worded items and the other factor representing reversescored items was tested. This model met criteria for at least acceptable model fit on all goodnessof-fit indices, which are presented in Table 5. The CFI, TLI, and RMSEA values were in
acceptable range, and the SRMR value was in good-fitting range; additionally, the χ² test of
model fit was considerably smaller than those from the six original measurement models.
Because this bifactor model with straightforwardly worded and reverse-scored factors was the
only model that had acceptable fit, its relative fit with the original six models was not examined.
The standardized factor loadings and standard errors for the bifactor model with
straightforwardly worded and reverse-scored factors are presented in Table 6. The variance
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explained by each factor was calculated by summing the squared factor loadings for that factor,
dividing by the sum of all squared factor loadings, and multiplying by 100 (Reise et al., 2013).
The general factor accounted for 58.2%, the straightforwardly worded specific factor accounted
for 17.9%, and the reverse-scored specific factor accounted for 23.8% of the total variance.
Because the variance accounted for by the general factor did not exceed 60% of the total
variance, the items cannot be said to reflect unidimensionality. Rather, the specific factors appear
to be capturing meaningful variance above and beyond the general factor. The meaning of these
specific factors were further investigated below.
Aim 2 CFAs for Relations among Indecisiveness, Depression, and Indecision
The resulting bifactor model of indecisiveness from Aim 1 was included in a larger CFA
with depression (represented as a higher-order model with four lower-order factors) and
indecision (represented by one factor with three indicators corresponding to average scores).
This model had acceptable fit, with χ²(1436) = 6015.66, p < .001, CFI = .91, TLI = .90, RMSEA
= .07, and SRMR = .07. The correlations among indecisiveness, depression, and indecision are
depicted in Figure 4, Panel A. The lower-order factors of depression had significant loadings
onto the higher order of depression (depressive affect = .97, positive affect = .64, somatic
symptoms = .97, and interpersonal problems = .88, all ps < .001). All factor loadings for each
factor were significant (ps < .05), with the exception of IS-GDB item 4 on the reverse-scored
factor of indecisiveness.
In this model, the general factor of indecisiveness, depression, and indecision were
strongly associated with one another (rs > .50, ps < .001), which is consistent with my
hypotheses. Of note, the straightforwardly worded factor of indecisiveness was also strongly
associated with depression (r = .54, p < .001). If the straightforwardly worded and reverse-scored
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specific factors were truly capturing method-related variance only, one would not expect to see
strong, significant correlations with substantive factors (i.e., depression, indecision). Despite
showing good model fit, bifactor models have a tendency to overfit the data (e.g., Murray &
Johnson, 2013), which could result in substantive variance getting pulled from a general factor to
a specific factor. To better investigate what the straightforwardly worded and reverse-scored
factors of indecisiveness represent, the following CFAs were undertaken and exploratory in
nature.
Exploratory Aim 2 CFAs for Relations among Indecisiveness, Depression, and Indecision
In one CFA, the straightforwardly worded specific factor of indecisiveness was taken out,
leaving the general factor and reverse-scored specific factor. This bifactor model allowed me to
see whether potential overfitting would still happen without the straightforwardly worded factor;
if not, the reverse-scored factor could be considered to represent method-related variance. In
another CFA, the bifactor structure was removed, and indecisiveness was instead represented by
two correlated factors, straightforwardly worded and reverse-scored. Because the general factor
is not part of the picture, both factors in this model would be expected to reflect substantive
variance. The two models had acceptable fits that were similar to each other: χ²(1454) = 6265.62,
p < .001, CFI = .91, TLI = .90, RMSEA = .07, and SRMR = .08 for the first model, and χ²(1470)
= 6326.80, p < .001, CFI = .91, TLI = .90, RMSEA = .07, and SRMR = .08 for the second
model. In both models, all factor loadings were significant at p < .05. Additionally, from both of
these models, when the indecisiveness factor was evaluated on its own (i.e., as a measurement
model), it also had acceptable fit; these fit indices were added to Table 5 along with the initially
planned Aim 1 indecisiveness models.
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The correlations among indecisiveness, depression, and indecision for the two models are
depicted in Figure 4, Panels B and C, respectively. In the bifactor model, the reverse-scored
specific factor of indecisiveness had significant correlations with depression and indecision (r =
.18 and r = -.28, respectively, ps < .001), although much smaller in magnitude compared to those
involving the general factor of indecisiveness (r = .74 and r = .70, respectively, ps < .001); these
smaller correlations could be viewed in support of the reverse-scored factor as capturing
primarily method-related variance. In the model with two-factor indecisiveness, the
straightforwardly worded factor had significant, strong correlations with depression and
indecision (r = .74 and r = .68, respectively, ps < .001), whereas the reverse-scored factor had a
significant, strong correlation with indecision (r = -.65, p < .001) and a significant,
comparatively smaller correlation with depression (r = -.29, p < .001); these correlations reflect
discriminant validity between the two factors, which seem to be capturing distinct yet related
constructs. Although both models had acceptable model fits and had correlations that made sense
within the context of the model, I chose to accept the two-factor model as the better conceptual
model. Upon revisiting the reverse-scored items themselves (listed in the bottom half of Table 6;
e.g., “I like to be in a position to make decisions,” “Once I make a decision, I feel fairly
confident that it is a good one”), these items seem to capture a sense of decision-making
confidence rather than reflect items that are the opposite of indecisiveness. In contrast, the
straightforwardly worded items (listed in the top half of Table 6; e.g., “When making a decision,
I feel uncertain,” “I often worry about making the wrong decision”) seem to more purely capture
indecisiveness. Thus, I viewed both of these factors as substantive rather than method-related.
To further test the hypothesis that the reverse-scored items reflect a substantive factor of
decision-making confidence, a CFA was run in which indecision was modeled differently.
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Instead of modeling indecision as a single factor with three indicators corresponding to average
scores on decision-making difficulty, decision-making confidence, and decision-making time
(averaged across the four decisions in the task), these three constructs were modeled as their own
factors, each with indicators corresponding to individual decision ratings instead of averages.
This model with indecisiveness (two factors), depression (higher-order with four lower-order
factors), and indecision (three factors) had acceptable fit, χ²(2532) = 8696.24, p < .001, CFI =
.90, TLI = .90, RMSEA = .06, and SRMR = .08. Supporting my hypothesis, the reverse-scored
indecisiveness factor had a stronger correlation with decision-making confidence (r = .54; p <
.001) than it did with decision-making difficulty and time (rs = -.18 and -.20, respectively; ps <
.001). In contrast, the straightforwardly worded indecisiveness factor had a stronger correlation
with decision-making difficulty (r = .66, p < .001) than it did with decision-making confidence (r
= -.37, p < .001) and time (r = .04, p = .26).
Before verbal IQ was added as a covariate to the final model now consisting of
indecisiveness and decision-making confidence (two-factor model), depression (higher-order
model with four lower-order factors), and indecision (one factor with three indicators
corresponding to average scores), a final exploratory CFA was run to examine whether the
original way of modeling indecision as one factor was acceptable. This was important because
the exact decision made (out of four decisions) in the indecision task was found to impact
decision-making difficulty, confidence, and time in my study, which was unlike the findings
from van Randenborgh et al. (2010). In this exploratory CFA, indecision was modeled as a
higher-order model with three lower-order factors of decision-making difficulty, confidence, and
time (each again with indicators corresponding to individual decisions rather than averages), and
its higher order factor was correlated with indecisiveness and decision confidence (two factors)
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and depression (higher-order factor). This model met for acceptable or close-to-acceptable fit on
indices, χ²(2538) = 9543.48, p < .001, CFI = .89, TLI = .89, RMSEA = .07, and SRMR = .09,
and all factor loadings were significant at p < .001. Compared to the correlations from the CFA
with indecision modeled as a single factor, correlations with indecision in this model were
significant and similar in magnitude (rs with indecisiveness = .64, decision confidence = -.67,
depression = .53, all ps < .001). These findings help to verify that the original modeling of
indecision as a single factor was a valid approach and one that was also likely more
parsimonious, given its better fit.
Final Aim 2 CFA for Relations among Indecisiveness, Depression, and Indecision, with
Verbal IQ as Covariate
Finally, verbal IQ was added as a covariate to the final model with indecisiveness and
decision-making confidence (two-factor model), depression (higher-order model with four
lower-order factors), and indecision (one factor with three indicators corresponding to average
scores). In this model, the effect of verbal IQ was partialled out from indecision. The model had
acceptable fit, χ²(1522) = 6450.72, p < .001, CFI = .91, TLI = .90, RMSEA = .07, and SRMR =
.08, and all factor loadings for each factor were significant (ps < .02). Correlations with
indecision remained statistically significant and were similar in magnitude (rs with
indecisiveness = .67, decision confidence = -.66, depression = .62, all ps < .001), compared to
the correlations in the model without verbal IQ. Thus, the hypothesized associations among
indecisiveness, depression, and indecision were still supported, after accounting for the effect of
verbal IQ on indecision.
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Additional Model Diagnostics for Final CFAs from Aims 1 and 2
Model from Aim 1. The two-factor model, with the straightforwardly worded factor
thought to represent indecisiveness and the reverse-scored factor thought to represent decisionmaking confidence, was evaluated for localized areas of strain. First, non-standardized residual
correlations ranged from .00 to .24. The highest correlation, .24, was not notably higher than the
correlations closest to it in value (i.e., .22, .21), and there seemed to be an even spread of values.
Thus, I did not find evidence of localized strain for pairs of indicators. Second, modification
indices above 10.0 ranged from 10.09 to 241.63. The largest modification index, 241.63, stood
out as an extreme value because it was 81.49 units higher than the second largest modification
index. The largest modification index corresponds to the expected decrease in χ² if item 3 from
the IS-GDB (i.e., “I don't know how to make decisions”) were allowed to cross-load onto the
decision-making confidence factor; the expected standardized factor loading would be .29. In
comparison, the standardized factor loading for item 3 from the IS-GDB for the indecisiveness
factor was .78. Thus, although knowing how to make decisions may be an aspect of decision
confidence, this item may be best kept as part of indecisiveness.
Model from Aim 2. The final model with indecisiveness and decision-making
confidence (two-factor model), depression (higher-order model with four lower-order factors),
and indecision (one factor with three indicators corresponding to average scores) was evaluated
for localized areas of strain. First, non-standardized residual correlations ranged from .00 to .32.
The highest correlation, .32, was not notably higher than the correlations closest to it in value
(i.e., .30, .30), and there seemed to be an even spread of values. Thus, I did not find evidence of
localized strain for pairs of indicators. Second, modification indices above 10.0 ranged from
10.04 to 1358.91. The largest modification index, 1358.91, stood out as an extreme value

37

because it was 858.12 units higher than the second largest modification index. The largest
modification index corresponds to the expected decrease in χ² if the decision-making confidence
factor were allowed to correlate with the positive affect lower-order factor of depression; the
expected standardized correlation would be .51. Examples of these positive affect items are: “I
felt just as good as other people” and “I felt hopeful about the future” (CES-D items 4 and 8,
respectively). This finding highlights the lack of this correlation in the model as a localized area
of strain, which if freely estimated, would likely significantly improve the global model fit.
Although the goal of the present study was not to study relations with subfactors of depressive
symptoms, the association between decision confidence and depressive symptoms related to
positive affect makes conceptual sense and may be important for future research on decision
confidence and depression to take into account.
Multiple-Groups CFAs for Testing Measurement Invariance
Model from Aim 1. The two-factor model, with the indecisiveness and decision-making
confidence factors, was evaluated for measurement invariance. From Step 1, the two-factor
model had at least close-to-acceptable fit when run separately for each sample. In the MTurk
sample, the model had at least acceptable fit on all indices, χ²(490) = 1255.60, p < .001, CFI =
.96, TLI = .96, RMSEA = .07, and SRMR = .06. In the ProA sample, the model had at least
acceptable fit on the CFI and SRMR and close-to-acceptable fit on the TLI and RMSEA, χ²(490)
= 2337.58, p < .001, CFI = .90, TLI = .89, RMSEA = .11, and SRMR = .05. In both samples, all
freely estimated factor loadings were statistically significant (ps < .001).
From Step 2, the model for the simultaneous test of equal form (i.e., identical factor
structure) had acceptable fit, χ²(980) = 3367.77, p < .001, CFI = .94, TLI = .93, RMSEA = .09,
and SRMR = .06. Together, findings from Step 1 and 2 suggest that the two-factor structure was
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equivalent across the MTurk and ProA samples. From Step 3, the model for the test of equal
factor loadings had at least acceptable fit on all indices, χ²(1011) = 2818.47, p < .001, CFI = .95,
TLI = .95, RMSEA = .08, and SRMR = .06. However, this model significantly degraded the fit
relative to the equal form model, χ²diff (31) = 73.58, p < .001, indicating that I could not conclude
that factor loadings were equivalent across the MTurk and ProA samples. I looked at which
factor loadings were furthest apart in size between the two samples; freeing these, one by one
(and up to 11 total), in subsequent tests of equal factor loadings did not result in a small enough
χ²diff for the test to be nonsignificant. Thus, I also could not conclude that the factor loadings in
the two samples were partially equivalent.
Model from Aim 2. The final model with indecisiveness and decision-making
confidence (two-factor model), depression (higher-order model with four lower-order factors),
and indecision (one factor with three indicators corresponding to average scores) was evaluated
for measurement invariance. From Step 1, this Aim 2 model had at least close-to-acceptable fit
when run separately for each sample. In the MTurk sample, the model had acceptable fit on most
indices and close-to-acceptable fit on the SRMR, χ²(1471) = 3662.78, p < .001, CFI = .93, TLI =
.93, RMSEA = .07, and SRMR = .09. In the ProA sample, the model had at least acceptable fit
on all indices, χ²(1471) = 3016.58, p < .001, CFI = .94, TLI = .94, RMSEA = .06, and SRMR =
.06.1 In the MTurk sample, all freely estimated factor loadings were statistically significant (ps <
.001), with the exception of decision-making time loading onto indecision (p = .36). In the ProA
sample, all freely estimated factor loadings were statistically significant (ps < .001).
From Step 2, the model for the simultaneous test of equal form (i.e., identical factor
structure) was run but resulted in an error involving the indecision factor about the covariance
matrix not being positive-definite in both the MTurk and ProA groups. Closer inspection
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revealed that the indecision factor had very high correlations (i.e., close to or higher than .90)
with other factors in both the MTurk sample (r with indecisiveness = .88, r with depression = .88) and ProA sample (r with indecisiveness = .86, r with decision confidence = -.96). These
correlations suggest that indecision is not a distinct latent variable, at least when modeled as part
of the simultaneous test of equal form in the two groups. Given that the Step 1 models had at
least close-to-acceptable fit but the Step 2 model resulted in these errors, there is some but not
conclusive evidence that the factor structure for the Aim 2 model was equivalent across the
MTurk and ProA samples. Furthermore, these group models shed light onto a potential problem
with the original conceptualization of indecisiveness, depression, and indecision as separate
latent variables.
Discussion
Indecisiveness, depression, and indecision have been studied in the literature in a
piecemeal fashion, leaving questions open about the dimensionality and validity of
indecisiveness and its exact relation to depression. Although past research has demonstrated a
consistent link between aspects of indecisiveness and depression (e.g., Bruine de Bruin, 2016;
Leykin & DeRubeis, 2010; Rassin et al., 2007), our understanding of indecisiveness as a
construct has been confounded by different features assessed in self-report questionnaires and by
different factor analysis methods to investigate dimensionality. Additionally, limited studies have
administered behavioral tasks of indecision to help validate indecisiveness. No study to date had
assessed both indecisiveness and indecision in the context of depression, which would help to
clarify the nuances of this type of decision-making difficulty.
In the present study involving a large sample of adults recruited online, I used the two
most widely administered indecisiveness questionnaires, the revised IS-FS and IS-GDB, in an
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attempt to comprehensively capture features of indecisiveness and to investigate the
dimensionality of indecisiveness through CFA (Aim 1). Through additional CFAs, I then tested
the relations among indecisiveness, depressive symptoms, and indecision (Aim 2). I found that,
when considered together, the revised IS-FS and IS-GDB were best represented by two factors
corresponding to straightforwardly worded and reverse-scored items. I believe that these factors
represent indecisiveness and decision-making confidence, respectively; in line with this
conceptualization, indecisiveness was found to be strongly positively associated with depressive
symptoms and indecision.
In Aim 1, I initially tested five competing hypotheses for the factor structure of
indecisiveness: (1) one-factor model; (2) two-factor model (i.e., aversive and avoidant); (3)
three-factor model (i.e., cognitive, affective, and behavioral); and the corresponding bifactor
models for the (4) two-factor (i.e., aversive and avoidant) and (5) three-factor (i.e., cognitive,
affective, behavioral) models. I also tested a sixth model, a bifactor model with two methodrelated factors (i.e., corresponding to items from the revised IS-FS versus IS-GDB), to rule out
questionnaire source as the reason driving factor structure. None of these six models fit well.
These findings are inconsistent with previous research that found evidence for a one-factor
model (Germeijs & De Boeck, 2002) and for the two-factor model with aversive and avoidant
factors (Spunt et al., 2009); however, these studies used only one indecisiveness questionnaire
which likely missed important features of the construct. These findings also do not support a
conceptualization of indecisiveness as three factors corresponding to cognitions, emotions, and
behaviors, as the main theory of indecisiveness suggests (Rassin, 2007).
After none of the six models fit well, I tested as a planned alternative a bifactor model
with two factors corresponding to straightforwardly worded and reverse-scored items. This
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model had acceptable fit, and its straightforwardly worded and reverse-scored factors captured
significant variance (i.e., over 40% of the total variance) above and beyond the general factor of
indecisiveness. This finding highlights the importance of evaluating factor structure based on
how items have been worded and scored, as other researchers have done (e.g., Rodebaugh et al.,
2006; Rodebaugh et al., 2007). Critically, reverse-scored items may represent the opposite of the
construct of interest, as these items are intended, or they may represent a substantive construct
that is different from the construct of interest. For example, the reverse-scored items in one
social anxiety questionnaire did seem to be the opposite of social anxiety (Rodebaugh et al.,
2004), whereas the reverse-scored items in a different social anxiety questionnaire were thought
to better represent extraversion and were therefore recommended to be excluded from the
assessment of social anxiety (Rodebaugh et al., 2007). Which explanation fits better depends to
some extent on how general, straightforwardly worded, and reverse-scored factors are associated
with other constructs, which was explored in Aim 2.
In Aim 2, I took the bifactor model of indecisiveness with straightforwardly worded and
reverse scored factors and tested its relations with depressive symptoms and indecision.
Although this bifactor model had acceptable fit in the context of this broader model, a strong
correlation between the straightforwardly worded factor and depressive symptoms suggested that
the model might have overfit the data, a tendency that has been found to be true of bifactor
models in general (e.g., Murray & Johnson, 2013). Thus, two exploratory models were run—a
bifactor model with a reverse-scored factor only and a two-factor model with straightforwardly
worded and reverse-scored factors. Both of these models had acceptable fit, and correlations
among the constructs suggested that the reverse-scored items of indecisiveness represented
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method-related variance in the former model and represented a substantive factor of decisionmaking confidence in the latter model.
I argue in favor for the latter, two-factor model as the better conceptual model, in which
the straightforwardly worded and reverse-scored factors reflect substantive factors corresponding
to indecisiveness and decision-making confidence, respectively. First, in the original bifactor
model (see above), the straightforwardly worded and reverse-scored factors captured significant
variance (i.e., over 40% of the total variance) above and beyond the general factor. Second, the
content of the reverse-scored items seem to reflect decision confidence, and this factor was
strongly positively associated with the decision confidence factor corresponding to the indecision
latent variable. Third, this conceptualization is also consistent with the broader decision-making
literature in which indecisiveness and decision confidence are separate yet related constructs.
Decision confidence has been shown to be negatively associated with indecisiveness (Ferrari &
Dovidio, 2001; Patalano & LeClair, 2011; Rassin et al., 2007) and has its own correlates such as
a greater ability to persuade others to support a choice (Sniezek & Van Swol, 2001). Moreover,
in studies on the neural correlates of decision-making, decision confidence has been touted as a
fundamental aspect of decision-making, at least for perceptual decisions (e.g., deciding whether
the color of presented stimuli is red or blue; Desender, Boldt, & Yeung, 2018; Kepecs, Uchida,
Zariwala, & Mainen, 2008; Rolls, Grabenhorst, & Deco, 2010).
In this final model with indecisiveness and decision confidence, there were positive
associations among indecisiveness, depressive symptoms, and indecision, which was in support
of my hypotheses. Furthermore, these associations held even after verbal IQ was added to the
model, ruling out verbal IQ as a potential confounding factor in associations involving
indecision. I expand on each of the associations among the three constructs here. First, the link
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between indecisiveness and depression found in past research was replicated in the present study
which involved a comprehensive assessment of indecisiveness. In fact, this association may have
been stronger in my study (at r = .74) than in past studies (e.g., Pearson r = .54; Di Schiena et al.,
2013) not only because error variance was parsed out (as part of CFA) but also because variance
related to decision confidence was parsed out; in contrast to indecisiveness, depressive
symptoms had a much smaller correlation with decision confidence (at r = -.29), highlighting the
discriminative validity between indecisiveness and decision confidence.
Next, the positive association between indecisiveness and indecision further validates
indecisiveness as a construct, through showing that a greater tendency to be indecisive (i.e.,
higher indecisiveness) was linked to greater indecision during in-the-moment decision-making.
Validation of indecisiveness with indecision in the literature had been done infrequently and only
through hypothetical decision scenarios (e.g., Frost & Shows, 1993). Successfully adapted for
my study, as demonstrated through pilot testing in a separate sample of participants, the van
Randenborgh et al. (2010) behavioral indecision task used (perceived to be) real decisions
associated with the “next part of the study” for participants and assessed participants’ ratings of
decision-making difficulty and confidence immediately after decisions were made. Overall, this
was a more ecologically-valid approach than prior research using hypothetical decisions.
Lastly, the positive association between depressive symptoms and indecision
demonstrates that depression is not only characterized by a self-reported tendency to be
indecisive (i.e., reflect increased indecisiveness) but also by increased indecision assessed by
both self-reported and objective measures. The van Randenborgh et al. (2010) indecision task
provided an objective measure of decision-making time in addition to self-report measures of
decision-making difficulty and confidence. It is therefore unlikely that depressed individuals are
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self-reporting increased indecisiveness on questionnaires simply due to negative biases in
retrospective recall (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010). Moreover, my findings build on van
Randenborgh et al. (2010)’s original findings on dysphoria which evaluated each of the three
indecision outcomes separately; in a CFA model involving latent variables, depressive symptoms
were positively related to indecision for which decision-making difficulty, confidence, and time
were all modeled as indicators.
As the final analysis in the study, I used multiple-groups CFA to address the main
limitation to this study, which was the use of two different online crowdsourcing platforms,
MTurk and ProA. MTurk and ProA participants were found to vary in some demographic
characteristics (i.e., race/ethnicity and educational level) as well as on almost all study measures
(i.e., revised IS-FS indecisiveness, depressive symptoms, indecision, and verbal IQ). Through
multiple-groups CFA, I found conclusive evidence that the two-factor structure of indecisiveness
and decision confidence was equivalent across the MTurk and ProA samples; I found only
moderate evidence that the same was true for the broader model involving indecisiveness,
decision confidence, depressive symptoms, and indecision. Neither the two-factor model of
indecisiveness and decision confidence nor the broader model involving all constructs met
criteria for equivalent factor loadings; as such, the remaining tests of equivalence (e.g., of
indicator intercepts, residual variances, factor variances) were not run.
Furthermore, the multiple-groups CFA findings from the broader model shed light onto
two critical issues. First, in the MTurk group, decision time no longer loaded significantly onto
the indecision factor, reflecting a departure of this indicator from the latent variable. Compared
to the ProA group, the MTurk group generally took less time to complete the study and may not
have been as attentive during it, which is consistent with the group passing fewer
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attention/comprehension checks and having more missing data in the open-ended verbal IQ
measure. ProA may ultimately be a better platform than MTurk for future online studies on
decision-making involving an objective measure of time. Second, in both the ProA and MTurk
groups, indecision had extremely high correlations with decision confidence and/or
indecisiveness. This finding calls into question that indecision can be modeled as a separate
latent variable from decision confidence and indecisiveness. It may be more parsimonious for
future research to model indecision as part of decision confidence or indecisiveness, depending
on the construct of interest. This was done with some success with indecisiveness in one
previous study, which did not assess in-the-moment indecision but rather assessed self-reported
indecision in specific situations (e.g., ordering at a restaurant; Germeijs & De Boeck, 2002).
Although this study had several strengths (e.g., use of CFA, comprehensive
indecisiveness assessment, inclusion of a realistic indecision task with subjective and objective
outcomes, and inclusion of a verbal IQ measure), there are two additional limitations that are
important to note. First, although the van Randenborgh et al. (2010) indecision task was
successfully adapted for my study, as shown through pilot testing in which the valence and
frequency of chosen decision options were similar to the original study, as well as the
believability of the task, the task outcomes differed based on the decision situation. More
specifically, repeated measures ANOVAs (that were run as part of descriptive statistics) showed
that the reward decision stood out from the other three decisions, with the reward decision being
associated with lower decision-making difficulty and time and with higher decision-making
confidence. This was likely because participants were already familiar with the decision options
presented (choice of a Target or Walmart e-gift card), which I had chosen to suit the online
format of the study. Future studies using the task could consider structuring the reward decision
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so that participants have potentially more information to learn about the choice options. Second,
I found that the open-ended nature of the verbal IQ measure resulted in having to drop data from
60 MTurk and 3 ProA participants (e.g., due to cheating, not understanding instructions), which
was about 10% of the full sample. Thus, I could not include verbal IQ as a covariate for these
participants. The WAIS-III vocabulary sub-test may not be optimal for online studies and may be
better suited for laboratory studies in which there is the option of an experimenter administering
the measure in-person.
In terms of future directions, it will be important to see if other studies replicate my
findings regarding the distinction between indecisiveness and decision-making confidence. If so,
this would mirror a recent pattern in the broader decision-making literature in which the scope of
self-questionnaires is being narrowed. For example, Cheek and Goebel (2020) examined
questionnaires on maximizing, the tendency to make the best possible decision after considering
all options, and found that the decision-making difficulty items in these questionnaires actually
represented indecisiveness and should not be included in the assessment of maximizing. Taking a
similar approach with indecisiveness, in which the reverse-scored items are not included, would
likely enhance our precision in assessing this construct. Doing so would allow researchers to
truly evaluate the dimensionality of this construct, whereas my Aim 1 findings on dimensionality
must be interpreted with caution because the models included the decision confidence items.
Lastly, because my study involved a non-clinical, online sample, it will be critical to see if my
Aim 2 findings on indecisiveness, indecision, and depressive symptoms extend to a clinically
depressed sample. I expect that it likely will, given the robust link that I found between
indecisiveness and depressive symptoms. If so, it would be ideal to then move towards testing
causality in a longitudinal design: Considering the link between indecisiveness and lower quality
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of life (Taillefer et al., 2016), indecisiveness may be an especially good candidate to evaluate as
a risk factor for depression.
The present study found evidence for a two-factor structure of indecisiveness
corresponding to the straightforwardly worded items and reverse-scored items from the revised
IS-FS and IS-GDB questionnaires. This study contributed to the literature by illustrating that the
straightforwardly worded and reverse-scored items may better represent indecisiveness and
decision-making confidence, respectively. These findings underscore the importance of assessing
the meaning of reverse-scored items in self-report questionnaires and may help to increase the
precision of indecisiveness assessment in future research. After decision confidence was
accounted for, indecisiveness as well as indecision showed strong associations with depressive
symptoms. Indecisiveness warrants further study in the clinical literature as a potentially
prominent area of decision-making difficulty in MDD. Better addressing this symptom as part of
treatment may ultimately lead to greater sense of well-being and quality of life for depressed
individuals.
Study 2
Introduction
It’s late in the day, and you’ve been working hard to meet a work deadline. However, you
promised to meet up with a few friends for dinner. Should you cancel on your friends and
continue to make progress on your work, or should you take a break and meet your friends? On
the one hand, if you continue to work, you might feel satisfied about getting things done but
lonely; on the other hand, if you join your friends, you might feel happy but guilty about not
doing work. Expected affect refers to predictions about the affective consequences of decision
outcomes and is a main component of theories that emphasize the role of affect in the decision-
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making process (Anderson, 2003; Baumeister, Vohs, DeWall, & Zhang, 2007; Lerner et al.,
2015; Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003; Mellers, 2000). For example, when making decisions,
people have been found to choose the option that maximizes expected PA (e.g., satisfied, happy)
and minimizes expected NA (e.g., lonely, guilty; for the main theory on expected affect, see
Mellers, 2000).
Expected affect is important to consider when seeking to understand decision-making
difficulty in MDD. Investigators have proposed that MDD influences people’s expectations
during decision-making: Specifically, the disorder may lead people to underestimate benefits and
to overestimate costs of decision options under consideration (Treadway & Zald, 2011). It is
likely that this effect of MDD is reflected in having lower expected PA and higher expected NA
for decision options. Indirect support for this hypothesis comes from the only study that
examined expected affect and decision-making in depression. Using hypothetical decision
scenarios, in which participants were presented potential benefits and costs of decision options,
Pietromonaco and Rook (1987) found that college students higher (versus lower) in depressive
symptoms assigned less weight to potential benefits for social decisions only (and not for moral
and financial decisions) and more weight to potential costs for all decision types. Decision
weight was a composite score of expected affect (i.e., how good/bad they expected to feel if the
benefit/cost were to happen), along with perceived importance (i.e., how important the
benefit/cost would be in making their decision) and likelihood (i.e., how likely it was that the
benefit/cost would happen). Consequently, research is needed to examine expected affect to
elucidate its unique role in decision-making difficulty in depression.
Converging evidence for altered expected affect in depression comes from the affective
forecasting and pleasure literatures. Affective forecasting refers to the process of predicting
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one’s affect more generally (Wilson & Gilbert, 2003), and when it is examined in depression,
people tend to expect lower PA and higher NA for the future. More specifically, lower expected
PA is associated with higher depressive symptoms (Hoerger, Quirk, Chapman, & Duberstein,
2012; Wenze, Gunthert, & German, 2012), as well as current MDD (MacLeod & Salaminiou,
2001; Mathersul & Ruscio, 2020; Zetsche, Bürkner, & Renneberg, 2019) and remitted MDD
(Thompson et al., 2017) in comparison to healthy controls. Likewise, higher expected NA is
associated with higher depressive symptoms (Hoerger et al., 2012; Wenze et al., 2012), as well
as current MDD (Mathersul & Ruscio, 2020; Zetsche et al., 2019) and remitted MDD
(Thompson et al., 2017). Paralleling findings from the affective forecasting literature, Wu et al.
(2017) found that people with current MDD, compared to healthy controls, expected to
experience lower pleasure and higher displeasure for anticipated daily activities. Importantly,
pleasure and displeasure have been treated as dimensions of PA and NA, respectively (Russell,
1980).
Given that both current and remitted MDD are associated with lower expected PA and
higher expected NA for the future (e.g., Thompson et al., 2017; Wu et al., 2017), it appears that
alterations in expected affect are a more trait-like effect representing a scar in MDD, rather than
a state-like effect from being in a depressive episode. In contrast to expected affect, it is not clear
whether decision-making difficulty represents a trait- or state-like effect in MDD. Whereas
current MDD is characterized by decision-making difficulty that is pervasive across a number of
research areas (Hallenbeck & Thompson, 2019), studies on decision-making in remitted MDD
samples are sparse, with no studies in the areas of indecisiveness or decision-making under
ambiguity. Further, existing studies show mixed findings, sometimes only include remitted MDD
and healthy control groups, and are difficult to interpret because they focus on different areas of
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decision-making. There is initial evidence of decision-making difficulty in remitted MDD in the
areas of decision-making under risk and social decision-making (Nakano et al., 2014; Ong, Zaki,
& Gruber, 2017; but see Pulcu et al., 2015) but null findings in the areas of intertemporal choice
and effort-based decision-making (Pulcu et al., 2014; Yang et al., 2014). Including both current
and remitted depressed groups, along with a healthy control group, in future studies would help
to clarify the nature of decision-making difficulty as a symptom and build upon the limited
remitted MDD and decision-making literature.
Lastly, although researchers have hypothesized a link between altered expectations and
decision-making difficulty in MDD (e.g., Treadway & Zald, 2011; Hallenbeck & Thompson,
2019), they have not specified the mechanism by which expected affect may contribute to
decision-making difficulty in the disorder. There are two possibilities that seem plausible based
on the broader affect and decision-making literature. One possibility is that people with MDD
experience decision-making difficulty because the overall attractiveness of decision options is
low. If people generally expect that, regardless of which decision option they select, they will
experience low PA and high NA, then it will not be motivating to make the decision in the first
place (Anderson, 2003; Shenhav, Dean Wolf, & Karmarkar, 2018); expected affect is thought to
be an important antecedent to motivation and goal-directed behavior (Baumeister et al., 2007;
Kring & Elis, 2013). I will refer to this hypothesis as the motivation hypothesis. Another
possibility is that people with MDD experience decision-making difficulty because the
attractiveness of decision options is similar when compared to one another. If people expect to
experience similar levels of PA and NA (e.g., low PA and high NA) for all decision options
under consideration, then it produces uncertainty for which option is the best option, and in turn,
can lead to anxiety and avoidance (Anderson, 2003; Rassin, 2007; Shenhav & Buckner, 2014).
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Because this would mean that people are less able to discriminate affectively between decision
options, I will refer to this hypothesis as the discrimination hypothesis. Importantly, low
expected PA and high expected NA may apply to both the motivation and discrimination
hypotheses; the key difference between the two hypotheses is how expected affect is represented
(i.e., through mean levels for the motivation hypothesis and through difference scores for the
discrimination hypothesis).
In the present study, to understand affect and decision-making difficulty in depression at
a fine-grained level, I included participants with either current or remitted depression, as well
healthy control participants. I used ecological momentary assessment (EMA), which is the
repeated sampling of experiences in daily life, to study expected affect and decision-making
difficulty. EMA is a powerful tool that has been increasingly popular in the field of affect
research but has only been used in a couple of studies on affect in the context of decision-making
(Bjälkebring, Västfjäll, Svenson, & Slovic, 2016; Parkinson & Simons, 2009), despite offering
several strengths. The method allows for the assessment of people’s real decisions in naturalistic
contexts, thus offering higher ecological validity, as opposed to hypothetical decisions that are
administered in the laboratory, which has been a more common approach (e.g., Pietromonaco &
Rook, 1987). Because of the repeated nature of the assessments, EMA can also capture the
decision-making process as it unfolds, including the anticipation (i.e., the evaluation of decision
options which involves expected affect) and selection of a decision option. Although this daily
life design may capture more everyday than life-changing decisions, everyday decisions can still
elicit anxiety even for unselected community participants (Shenhav et al., 2018) and may be
especially true of those with depression. Participants in the study were asked to rate their
expected affect for decisions that they anticipated making and then subsequently indicate
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whether they made those decisions; making fewer decisions served as an index of decisionmaking difficulty, which is consistent with past research showing that MDD is associated with
procrastination of decisions (Alexander et al., 2017).
The present study had three aims and corresponding hypotheses. Aim 1 was to compare
expected affect during decision-making across current depressed, remitted depressed, and
healthy control groups. Compared to the control group, both the current and remitted depressed
groups were hypothesized to have lower expected PA and higher expected NA for decision
options under consideration, which is consistent with preliminary decision-making findings
(Pietromonaco & Rook, 1987), as well as with the broader literature on affective forecasting and
pleasure (e.g., Thompson et al., 2017; Wu et al., 2017). Aim 2 was to compare decision-making
difficulty (i.e., a lower frequency of decisions made) across the current depressed, remitted
depressed, and healthy control groups. Compared to the control group, the current depressed
group was hypothesized to show decision-making difficulty through making fewer anticipated
decisions. Because of the mixed findings on decision-making difficulty in remitted MDD, the
analysis comparing the remitted depressed and control groups was exploratory.
Lastly, Aim 3 was to examine whether and how expected affect is associated with
decision-making difficulty, comparing across the different groups. This would test the
motivation hypothesis against the discrimination hypothesis for the depressed groups. Support
for the motivation hypothesis would involve having overall levels of expected PA and NA across
decision options emerge as significant predictors of decision-making difficulty. Specifically,
lower PA and higher NA would be related to decision-making difficulty. Support for the
discrimination hypothesis would involve having differences in expected PA and NA between
decision options emerge as significant predictors of decision-making difficulty. Specifically,
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smaller differences in PA and NA would be related to decision-making difficulty. A final
possibility is that there may be an interactive effect between levels of and differences in expected
PA and NA, which would provide support for both the motivation and discrimination
hypotheses.
Method
Participants
Participants (n = 215) were recruited between October 2017 and May 2019 for a broader
study on emotion and depression. They were recruited from the St. Louis community through
advertisements posted online (e.g., Craigslist) and at local clinics and businesses, as well as
through a university research participant registry. For all participants, inclusion criteria included
being between the ages of 18 and 77 years (inclusive), speaking English as their primary
language, and having no severe visual or hearing impairments. Inclusion criteria for the three
groups were: (a) For the current depressed group (n = 48), participants must have been in a
current major depressive episode (MDE) that was experienced in the context of MDD (n = 37) or
persistent depressive disorder (PDD; n = 11); (b) For the remitted depressed group (n = 80),
participants must have had two MDEs in full remission that were experienced in the context of
MDD or PDD (MDD only, n = 65; PDD only, n = 6; both MDD and PDD, n = 9); (c) For the
healthy control group (n = 87), participants must not have had a current or past depressive
disorder or any anxiety disorders (i.e., generalized anxiety disorder, social anxiety disorder,
panic disorder, or agoraphobia; specific phobias were not assessed). In addition, exclusion
criteria for all groups included having current or past psychosis and bipolar disorders. The final
sample of 215 participants does not include participants who withdrew from the study (n = 7),
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experienced technical issues with the EMA survey application (n = 6), or had low compliance
with completing EMA surveys (i.e., completed < 20% of surveys; n = 7).
Target sample sizes were pre-determined to ensure sufficient power to answer all
research questions included in the broader study. For example, the target sample size was smaller
for the current depressed group than for the remitted depressed group due to larger effect sizes
expected for the current depressed group. Additionally, for my research questions specifically,
existing simulation studies suggested that I had a large enough sample size to detect at least
medium-sized effects (Maas & Hox, 2005; Moineddin, Matheson, & Glazier, 2007). For
example, Moineddin et al. (2007) also used multilevel modeling with binary outcomes, which
was the case for the majority of my models (see Analysis Plan below). For a model with one
Level 1 predictor and one Level 2 predictor and an ICC of 0.38 (similar to one of my more
complex models, Model 3 below), they found that 100 Level 2 units each containing five Level 1
units did not produce significant biased estimates in fixed effects and did not result in
significantly large non-coverage values (i.e., the percentage of time the 95% confidence interval
does not contain the true value). The 215 participants (Level 2 units) each with up to 14 daylevel surveys (Level 1 units) in my study exceeded their parameters, which meant that I likely
had increased power to also detect smaller effect sizes.
The full sample of participants had a mean age of 44.3 (SD = 16.1) years and was
composed of 66.0% women. With regard to race/ethnicity, the sample was 69.8% Caucasian,
19.5% Black or African American, 2.8% Asian or Asian American, 0.5% Native American or
Alaska Native, 7.0% other or multiracial, and 0.5% did not report; 1.4% reported that they were
also Hispanic or Latinx. Participants’ highest level of education was: bachelor’s degree (32.6%),
graduate or professional degree (31.6%), some college (24.2%), or high school diploma (9.3%).
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Participants’ employment status was: 19.1% employed part-time, 40.9% employed full-time,
14.4% retired, and 10.7% unemployed; others were on disability (2.8%), a stay-at-home
spouse/parent (1.9%), seasonally employed (1.9%), on temporary shutdown (0.5%), or did not
report (1.9%). Participants’ relationship status was: 30.2% never married, 28.8% married, 12.6%
living with a romantic partner, 19.5% divorced, 5.1% separated, 2.3% widowed, and 1.4% did
not report.
Demographic and clinical characteristics separated by group are presented in Table 7.
There were no significant group differences in age, F(2, 212) = 0.72, p =.49, gender, χ2(2, N =
215) = 4.83, p = .09, and race/ethnicity, χ2(8, N = 214) = 6.04, p = .64. In addition, the three
groups did not differ on highest level of education, χ2(10, N = 212) = 10.74, p = .38, employment
status, χ2(16, N = 212) = 23.26, p = .11, or relationship status, χ 2(2, N = 212) = 13.18, p = .21.
Consequently, I did not include any demographic variables as covariates in the subsequent
analyses. Consistent with clinical diagnoses, the groups differed with respect to the presence of a
current anxiety disorder, with each of the groups differing from the others (ps < .001).
Procedure
Interested individuals first completed a phone screen, administered by research assistants,
that assessed demographic characteristics and cardinal depression symptoms (i.e., depressed
mood and/or anhedonia nearly every day for at least two weeks). Individuals were invited to
participate in the study if they endorsed current or past symptoms (reflecting that they may be
eligible for one of the depressed groups) or no symptoms at all (reflecting that they may be
eligible for the healthy control group). Participants completed an online survey which included
an informed consent and demographic assessment before attending one laboratory session. At the
laboratory session, participants provided a second informed consent and completed the mood,
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psychosis, and anxiety disorder modules of the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-5 –
Research Version (SCID-5-RV; First, Williams, Karg, & Spitzer, 2015), which was administered
by clinical psychology doctoral students. Case consultations with a clinical psychologist were
completed over the phone during participant sessions. Diagnostic reliability was assessed by
randomly selecting and rerating about 20% of the recorded interviews. Interrater reliability for
MDD and PDD diagnoses was excellent (kappas = 1.00).
Eligible participants based on the SCID-5-RV then completed a series of self-report
measures and computer tasks; the measure relevant to the current study is described below.
Lastly, they completed a 30-minute EMA tutorial provided by a research assistant, who
instructed them on each item through the use of a PowerPoint presentation and also asked for
examples to try to ensure their comprehension. Participants completed a full survey for practice,
took home a copy of the survey instructions, and were encouraged to call the lab with any
questions about the survey.
The EMA protocol was delivered through an iOS mobile application, Status/Post,
designed by Christopher Metts, Ph.D. The application was downloaded onto the participant’s
iPhone or onto a lab-provided 6th generation iPod Touch. The application collected data offline
so that the sample could be more inclusive (e.g., of low-income participants who may not have
access to wireless internet) and ultimately more representative of the community. Starting on the
day after their lab session, participants were prompted to complete 14 days of EMA, with five
surveys each day, for a total of 70 surveys. These surveys occurred within a 15-hour period of
participants’ choice (e.g., from 7am to 10pm) and were randomly presented within five 3-hour
windows; the mean time between surveys was 3 hours and 0 minutes (SD = 1 hour and 1
minute). Surveys expired after 15 minutes if they were unanswered. To encourage compliance
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with filling out surveys, research assistants called participants two days after the start of the
EMA period to ask if they had any questions; they also provided participants with their survey
completion rate halfway through the EMA period. Participants were compensated $12/hour for
their lab session and $40 for the EMA period, with a $10 bonus for completing at least 80% of
the surveys. This study was approved by the Institutional Review Board at Washington
University in St. Louis.
Measures
Expected affect. During the first survey of each day, participants were asked to think
about a decision that they anticipated making that day. If participants missed the first survey of
the day, they were asked about their anticipated decision during the first subsequent survey they
completed. Participants typed a brief description of their top two decision options under
consideration into textboxes (character limit: 160); these open-ended responses were later coded
(details below). Then, for each decision option, they rated both expected PA and NA in the
following steps. The application first oriented them to their first decision option by populating
the following with their previous description: “The next few questions will ask you about your
thoughts and feelings related to choosing [Decision Option 1].” Expected PA and NA were
assessed by the question: “If the most likely positive (negative) outcome were to occur, how
positive (negative) would you feel?” Participants indicated their ratings by moving a slider along
a 10-point scale which was anchored with 0 = Neutral, 10 = Extremely Positive (Negative). The
items are repeated for the second decision option. Previous EMA and daily diary studies have
also assessed one decision per day (Bjälkebring et al., 2016; Parkinson & Simons, 2009), which
was frequent enough to capture meaningful variance while also reducing participant burden.
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Each participant was carefully instructed on the expected affect items during his or her
EMA tutorial at the lab session. To help promote learning and retention of the items, the
experimenter prompted the participant to use a personal example of an anticipated decision; if a
participant reported difficulty in thinking of a decision, the experimenter offered ideas of
common decision topics. Once a personal example was selected, and two decision options were
identified (e.g., take a walk or watch TV), the experimenter asked the participant to think about
the first option (e.g., take a walk) and to generate a few possible positive outcomes (e.g., enjoy
the weather, get exercise) that would happen as a result of choosing this option. Then, the
participant practiced rating how positive he or she would feel for the most likely outcome, using
the scale described above. In parallel, the participant was asked to generate a few possible
negative outcomes (e.g., become tired, get bitten by insects) for the same decision option and
practiced rating how negative he or she would feel for the most likely negative outcome. The
entire process was repeated for the second decision option (e.g., watch TV).
Two undergraduate research assistants coded the validity and impact of participants’
anticipated decisions based on their descriptions of their top two options under consideration
(i.e., Decision Option 1 and Decision Option 2). They coded whether the anticipated decision
was valid (i.e., the two decision options reflected two distinct options), invalid (i.e., the two
decision options were the same/had nonsense words or only one decision option was described),
missing (i.e., the decision options were left blank), or not applicable (i.e., the decision options
had text that indicated that there was no anticipated decision to be made, such as “No decision”
or “None”). Additionally, to provide descriptive information for valid anticipated decisions, they
coded the potential impact of the decision on the person’s life, ranging from 1 = minimal impact
(e.g., deciding whether to go out to lunch) to 2 = mild impact (e.g., deciding whether to tell sister
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about surprise birthday party) to 3 = medium impact (e.g., deciding whether to go on vacation) to
4 = high impact (e.g., deciding whether to change jobs); they also coded whether the decision
involved other people. Both research assistants independently coded each anticipated decision
from all participants and had weekly group meetings with me to discuss discrepancies/questions
and come to a consensus. Interrater reliability for the validity of anticipated decisions, impact of
anticipated decisions, and presence of a social component in the anticipated decisions was good,
kappas = .90, .82, and .92, respectively. Only data from valid anticipated decisions were used in
the analyses below (from here on referred to as anticipated decisions).
For each anticipated decision, two sets of composite variables for expected affect were
calculated—for level of expected affect and for difference in expected affect. First, for level of
expected affect, I calculated mean expected PA by averaging the PA ratings from the two
decision options and did the same to calculate mean expected NA. These expected PA and NA
levels were used to evaluate Aim 1 and Aim 3 (motivation hypothesis). Their reliabilities,
averaged across surveys within participants, were .90 and .89, respectively; all reliabilities were
calculated based on guidelines from Nezlek (2017). Second, for the difference in expected affect,
I subtracted the PA rating for one decision option (i.e., Decision Option 2) from the PA rating for
the other decision option (i.e., Decision Option 1) and took its absolute value, resulting in the
difference for PA; I did the same to calculate a difference for NA. These expected PA and NA
differences were used to evaluate Aim 3 (discrimination hypothesis). Their reliabilities, averaged
across surveys within participants, were .73 and .66, respectively.
Decision-making difficulty. At subsequent surveys, after reporting on their anticipated
decision and expected affect, participants were asked whether they made their anticipated
decision. Participants had the option of indicating yes or no, as well as indicating that the
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decision was no longer relevant (i.e., they did not have to make the decision anymore). If
participants indicated yes, they provided a brief description of which option they selected by
typing into a text box (character limit: 160); this open-ended response was later coded (details
below). “No” responses for all subsequent surveys that day were coded as 1 at the day level, to
reflect that the anticipated decision was not made that day; thus, a “Yes” response or a “No
longer relevant” response at any subsequent survey that day was coded as 0 at the day level. This
dichotomous, day level variable was my behavioral index of decision-making difficulty. To
provide validation for this conceptualization, I examined how the proportion of anticipated
decisions not made was associated with composite scores on the 11-item revised Indecisiveness
Scale (Rassin et al., 2007; α in this sample = .88). The correlation was small but statistically
significant, r = .15, p = .03.
To provide descriptive information for decisions that were made, the same two
undergraduate research assistants coded whether the chosen option was one of the two initially
reported options (i.e., Decision Option 1 or Decision Option 2), an option that represented a
compromise between the two initially reported options, or a new option distinct from the initially
reported options; they also coded if the chosen option was described too vaguely to be coded
clearly, as well as if the chosen option was missing (i.e., left blank or its text indicated that the
participant could not remember what he or she chose). As before, both research assistants
independently coded each decision made by all participants and had weekly group meetings with
me to discuss discrepancies/questions and come to a consensus. Interrater reliability for coding
the decisions made was high, kappa = .90.
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Analysis Plan
First, I calculated frequency and descriptive information relevant to anticipated and
completed decisions. This included the: percentage of EMA surveys completed; percentage of
anticipated decisions reported (i.e., the number of anticipated decisions divided by the number of
days in which at least one EMA survey was completed, multiplied by 100); mean impact of
anticipated decisions, percentage of anticipated decisions for which an outcome is reported (i.e.,
whether the decision was made, not made, or no longer relevant); percentages of anticipated
decisions that were made and not made; and for decisions that were made, percentage of
decisions for which the chosen option was one of the two initially reported options. I tested
whether these variables differed by group. All of these calculations were performed with
aggregate EMA data averaged across participants using SPSS Statistics for Macintosh (Version
25.0; IBM, 2017).
Then, to investigate my three aims, I used multilevel modeling, which is appropriate for
the nested structure of the data, in which surveys are nested within participants. Multilevel
modeling allows for the estimation of both between- and within-person effects without assuming
independence of the data (Krull & MacKinnon, 2011). It is also able to account for varying time
intervals between surveys and missing data for unanswered surveys (Snijders & Bosker, 2011).
To run multilevel modeling analyses, I used the lme4 package in R (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, &
Walker, 2015). As additional descriptive information, within- and between-person correlations
were calculated and presented for the predictors in my models (i.e., expected PA level, expected
NA level, expected PA difference, and expected NA difference).
Model equations corresponding to the three aims are shown in the results below. In these
equations, Level 1 is the day level because there was one set of decision data per day (albeit
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collected through different surveys). Level 2 is the level of participants. Subscripts i and j
represent days and participants, respectively. The letters r and u represent Level 1 and 2
residuals, respectively; Level 2 residuals are assumed to be normally distributed and free of
outliers. In order to compare the three groups in each of my aims, I created three group variables
dummy-coded so that the named group was = 1 and the other two groups were = 0 (e.g., current
depressed group variable: healthy control group = 0, current depressed group = 1, remitted
depressed group = 0). I ran models with different combinations of these group variables so that
all possible group differences were examined; however, I present only the equations for models
that have the healthy control group as the reference group.
For Aim 1, the outcome variable relates to overall levels of expected PA and NA. For
Aims 2 and 3, the outcome variable relates to whether the anticipated decision was made that
day (1 = decision not made, and 0 = decision made). Because the outcome is binary, a binomial
sampling distribution and logit function were used to obtain predicted values. Therefore,
coefficients of predictors in these models were displayed in logits, which represent the natural
log of the odds of experiencing an outcome. Logits can then be transformed into probabilities to
more readily understand the likelihood of an anticipated decision not being made. In these
models, residuals for Level 1 are not listed because the Level 1 variance is known for binomial
distributions. For Aim 3, all expected affect variables were person-mean centered at Level 1.
Lastly, if group differences were significant for any of the three aims, I examined whether the
findings held after adding presence of current anxiety disorder as a covariate (0 = no current
anxiety disorder and 1 = current generalized anxiety disorder, social anxiety disorder, panic
disorder, and/or agoraphobia).
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Results
Frequency and Descriptive Statistics for Anticipated and Completed Decisions
On average, participants completed 74.8% (SD = 18.3%) of the 70 surveys over the EMA
period, which did not vary by group, F(2) = 0.30, p = .74. A total of 211 out of the 215
participants reported at least one anticipated decision over the EMA period. On average,
participants reported an anticipated decision 88.9% (SD = 22.6%) of the time; this percentage did
not vary by group, F(2) = 1.84, p = .16. Anticipated decisions were primarily reported during the
first survey of the day (i.e., 77.0% during the first survey, 15.3% during the second survey, 5.2%
during the third survey, 1.7% during the fourth survey, and 0.7% during the fifth survey). The
mean impact of anticipated decisions was 1.25 (SD = 0.29), reflecting everyday decisions with
relatively minimal impact; mean impact did not vary by group, F(2) = 1.35, p = .26. On average,
participants’ anticipated decisions involved a social component 25.4% (SD = 21.6%) of the time;
this percentage did not vary by group, F(2) = 2.06, p = .13.
For the first six participants of the study, I did not have information on the outcome of
their anticipated decisions, because those EMA items had not yet been added to the survey
application. On average, the remaining participants reported at least once on the outcome for
94.6% (SD = 10.6%) of their anticipated decisions, with an average of 2.85 (SD = 0.74) reports
during subsequent surveys of the day; the percentage of anticipated decisions for which there is
at least one reported outcome did not vary by group, F(2) = 0.57, p = .56. With regard to
decision outcome at the day level, on average, participants made 76.2% (SD = 24.6%) of their
anticipated decisions and did not make 12.6% (SD = 18.8%) of their anticipated decisions; the
remainder of decisions (M = 11.3%, SD = 17.5%) were indicated as no longer applicable.
Percentages of completed and uncompleted anticipated decisions did not vary by group, F(2) =
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0.24, p = .78, and F(2) = 0.56, p = .58, respectively. Lastly, for decisions that were made,
participants chose one of the two initially reported options 70.6% (SD = 29.8%) of the time and
did not choose one of the initially reported options 7.2% (SD = 15.5%) of the time. The
remainder of decisions reflected a chosen option that represented a compromise between the
initially reported options (M = 1.8%, SD = 5.9%), a chosen option too vaguely described to be
coded (M = 3.9%, SD = 13.9%), and a chosen option that was left blank or was not remembered
(M = 16.4%, SD = 24.7%). Percentages of decisions for which the chosen option was or was not
one of the initially reported options did not differ by group, F(2) = 1.18, p = .31, and F(2) = 0.52,
p = .59, respectively.
Relations among Expected Affect Variables
Within- and between-person correlations among expected PA level, expected NA level,
expected PA difference, and expected NA difference for each group are presented in Table 8. For
all three groups, within- and between-person correlations between expected PA level and
expected NA level were positive and significant, as was the case for expected PA difference and
expected NA difference, indicating that mean levels and differences hung together across affect
valence. For all three groups, within- and between-person correlations between expected PA
level and expected PA difference were negative and significant. In contrast, for the healthy
control and remitted depressed groups, within- and between-person correlations between
expected NA level and expected NA difference were positive and significant; for the current
depressed group, these correlations were not significant. Thus, within affect valence, PA and NA
appear to differ in how their mean levels and differences were related to each other (i.e., negative
for PA and positive for NA); the exception to this was the current depressed group for which
correlations for NA were not significant.
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Aim 1 – Examining Group Differences in Expected Affect Levels
I first examined whether there were group differences in expected affect levels for
anticipated decisions.2 ICCs from the unconditional models (i.e., models with the affect variable
as the outcome and with no predictors) revealed that 40.5% of the variance in expected PA level,
and 36.4% of the variance in expected NA level, was at the between-person level, suggesting that
there was a significant amount of variance that could be explained by Level 2 predictors such as
group. Group variables were added as predictors in the following model (Model 1):
Level 1 Model (day level):
Expected (PA or NA) Levelij = 0j + rij
Level 2 Model (participant level):
0j = 00 + 01 Remitted + 02 Current + u0j
At Level 1, 0j represents each participant’s mean expected affect level across days. At Level 2,
00 represents the mean expected affect level for the healthy control group, 01 represents the
difference in mean expected affect level between the healthy control and remitted depressed
groups, and 02 represents the difference in mean expected affect level between the healthy
control and current depressed groups.
Mean expected PA level for the healthy control group was significantly different from
zero, 00 = 6.47, SE = 0.19, t(211) = 34.78, p < .001 (mean expected PA levels for the depressed
groups were also significantly different from zero, ts(211) > 28.12, ps < .001). Level 1 and 2
residual variances (rij and u0j) were 3.72 and 2.52, respectively. Contrary to hypotheses, expected
PA levels for the remitted and current depressed groups did not significantly differ from the
healthy control group, 01 = 0.02, SE = 0.26, t(211) = 0.08, p = .93, and 02 = 0.44, SE = 0.31,
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t(211) = 1.44, p = .15, respectively. Expected PA level for the remitted and current depressed
groups also did not significantly differ from each other, 01 = -0.42, t(211) = -1.36, p = .18.
Mean expected NA level for the control group was significantly different from zero, 00 =
3.42, SE = 0.19, t(211) = 17.88, p < .001 (mean expected NA levels for the depressed groups
were also significantly different from zero, ts(211) > 18.92, ps < .001). Level 1 and 2 residual
variances (rij and u0j) were 4.95 and 2.58, respectively. Consistent with hypotheses, the current
depressed group reported a higher expected NA level than did the healthy control group, 02 =
1.37, SE = 0.32, t(211) = 4.32, p < .001. The current depressed group also reported a higher
expected NA level than did the remitted depressed group, 01 = 0.90, t(211) = 2.81, p = .005.
However, contrary to hypotheses, the remitted depressed and healthy control groups did not
differ in expected NA level 01 = 0.47, SE = 0.27, t(211) = 1.73, p = .08. Means of expected PA
and NA levels by group are displayed in Figure 5.
To examine its impact on mean expected NA level, presence of a current anxiety disorder
was added to Model 1 as a Level 2 predictor. This predictor was not statistically significant, 03 =
0.48, SE = 0.37, t(211) = 1.28, p = .20, indicating that participants with or without a current
anxiety disorder did not differ in mean expected NA level. As before, the current depressed
group had a higher expected NA level than the healthy control group, 02 = 1.04, SE = 0.41,
t(211) = 2.54, p = .01, and the remitted depressed and healthy control groups did not differ in
expected NA level, 01 = 0.38, SE = 0.28, t(211) = 1.36, p = .18. However, the current depressed
group was now only marginally significantly different from the remitted depressed group in
expected NA level, 01 = 0.65, SE = 0.37, t(211) = 1.77, p = .08, indicating that expected NA
level in the remitted depressed group may have been partly driven by presence of current anxiety
disorder.

67

Aim 2 – Examining Group Differences in Decision-Making Difficulty
Then, I examined whether there were group differences in decision-making difficulty,
operationalized as the anticipated decision not being made at the day level. The ICC from the
unconditional model revealed that 43.3% of the variance in the decision not made outcome was
at the between-person level, suggesting that there was a significant amount of variance that could
be explained by Level 2 predictors such as group. Group variables were added as predictors in
the following model (Model 2):
Level 1 Model (day level):
Decision Not Madeij = 0j
Level 2 Model (participant level):
0j = 00 + 01 Remitted + 02 Current + u0j
At Level 1, 0j represents each participant’s mean likelihood (in logits) of not making an
anticipated decision across days. At Level 2, 00 represents the mean likelihood of not making an
anticipated decision for the healthy control group, 01 represents the difference in the mean
likelihood of not making an anticipated decision between the healthy control and remitted
depressed groups, and 02 represents the difference in the mean likelihood of not making an
anticipated decision between the healthy control and current depressed groups.
Mean likelihood of not making an anticipated decision for the healthy control group was
significantly different from zero, 00 = -2.91, SE = 0.26, z = -11.19, p < .001 (mean likelihoods
for the depressed groups were also significantly different from zero, zs > -8.33, ps < .001). Level
2 residual variance (u0j) was 2.52. Contrary to hypotheses, the likelihood of not making an
anticipated decision for the current depressed group did not significantly differ from the healthy
control group, 02 = 0.35, SE = 0.38, z = 0.91, p = .36. The likelihood of not making an

68

anticipated decision for the remitted depressed group also did not significantly differ from the
healthy control group, 01 = 0.23, SE = 0.33, z = 0.70, p = .48, or from the current depressed
group, 01 = -0.12, z = -0.31, p = .76.
Aim 3 – Examining Relations between Expected Affect and Decision-Making Difficulty for
All Groups
Although there were no group differences in decision-making difficulty, I investigated
the possibility that the relations between expected affect and decision-making difficulty still
varied by group. I explored whether significant relations were consistent with the motivation
hypothesis, discrimination hypothesis, or both. Starting with the motivation hypothesis, I entered
expected affect level as a Level 1 predictor of decision-making difficulty in the following model
(Model 3):
Level 1 Model (day level):
Decision Not Madeij = 0j + 1j Expected (PA or NA) Level
Level 2 Model (participant level):
0j = 00 + 01 Remitted + 02 Current + u0j
1j = 10 + 11 Remitted + 12 Current + u1j
At Level 1, 0j represents each participant’s mean likelihood (in logits) of not making an
anticipated decision at the participant’s mean expected affect level; 1j represents the change in
the likelihood of not making an anticipated decision per unit change in expected affect level for
each participant. At Level 2, 10 represents the slope between expected affect level and likelihood
of not making an anticipated decision for the healthy control group; 11 represents the difference
in slopes between expected affect level and not making an anticipated decision between the
healthy control and the remitted depressed groups; and 12 represents the difference in slopes
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between expected affect level and not making an anticipated decision between the healthy
control and the current depressed groups.
For PA, the association between expected affect level and the likelihood of not making an
anticipated decision was not significant in the healthy control group, 10 = -0.03, z = -0.52, p =
.61 (the associations for the depressed groups were also not significant, zs < 1.32, ps > .18).
Level 2 residual variance for the intercept (u0j) was 2.52; Level 2 residual variance for the slope
(u1j) was extremely close to 0 and removed from the model to allow it to run efficiently. Further,
the association between expected PA level and decision not made was not significantly different
between the remitted depressed and healthy control groups or between the current depressed and
healthy control groups, 11 = 0.12, z = 1.31, p = .19, and 12 = 0.01, z = 0.09, p = .92, respectively.
This association was not significantly different between the remitted and current depressed
groups either, 11 = 0.11, z = 1.10, p = .27.
For NA, the association between expected affect level and the likelihood of not making
an anticipated decision was also not significant in the healthy control group, 10 = -0.06, z = 0.78, p = .44 (the associations for the depressed groups were also not significant, zs < -0.41, ps >
.68). Level 2 residual variances (u0j and u1j) were 2.55 and 0.006, respectively. Further, the
association between expected NA level and decision not made was not significantly different
between the remitted depressed and healthy control groups or between the current depressed and
healthy control groups, 11 = 0.05, z = 0.61, p = .54, and 12 = 0.03, z = 0.34, p = .73, respectively.
This association was not significantly different between the remitted and current depressed
groups either, 11 = 0.02, z = 0.22, p = .82. Because none of the group terms were significant for
either expected PA or NA level, these findings do not provide support for the motivation
hypothesis.
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To investigate the discrimination hypothesis, I ran a model similar to Model 3, entering
expected affect difference as a Level 1 predictor in place of expected affect level. For PA, the
association between expected affect difference and the likelihood of not making an anticipated
decision was not significant in the healthy control group, 10 = -0.07, z = -0.89, p = .37 (the
associations for the depressed groups were also not significant, zs < -0.46, ps > .65). Level 2
residual variances (u0j and u1j) were 2.57 and 0.01, respectively. Further, the association between
expected PA difference and decision not made was not significantly different between the
remitted depressed and healthy control groups or between the current depressed and healthy
control groups, 11 = 0.09, z = 1.24, p = .22, and 12 = 0.03, z = 0.34, p = .73, respectively. This
association was not significantly different between the remitted and current depressed groups
either, 11 = 0.06, z = 0.71, p = .48.
For NA, the association between expected affect difference and the likelihood of not
making an anticipated decision was also not significant in the healthy control group, 10 = 0.08, z
= 0.90, p = .37 (the associations for the depressed groups were also not significant, zs < 1.34, ps
> .18). Level 2 residual variances (u0j and u1j) were 2.60 and 0.02, respectively. Further, the
association between expected NA difference and decision not made was not significantly
different between the remitted depressed and healthy control groups or between the current
depressed and healthy control groups, 11 = 0.02, z = 0.21, p = .83, and 12 = -0.05, z =- 0.48, p =
.63, respectively. This association was not significantly different between the remitted and
current depressed groups either, 11 = 0.07, z = 0.72, p = .47. Because none of the group terms
were significant for either expected PA or NA difference, these findings do not provide support
for the discrimination hypothesis.
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Lastly, to investigate the possibility that there is an interactive effect between levels of
and differences in expected affect for the different groups, I entered expected affect level,
expected affect difference, and their interaction as Level 1 predictors of decision-making
difficulty in the following model (Model 4):
Level 1 Model (day level):
Decision Not Madeij = 0j + 1j Expected (PA or NA) Level + 2j Expected (PA or
NA) Difference + 3j Expected (PA or NA) Level * Expected (PA or NA)
Difference
Level 2 Model (participant level):
0j = 00 + 01 Remitted + 02 Current + u0j
1j = 10 + 11 Remitted + 12 Current
2j = 20 + 21 Remitted + 22 Current
3j = 30 + 31 Remitted + 32 Current
At Level 2, 30 represents the slope for the interaction between expected affect level and expected
affect difference in predicting the likelihood of not making an anticipated decision in the healthy
control group; 31 represents the difference in slopes for the expected affect interaction term
between the healthy control and the remitted depressed groups; and 32 represents the difference
in slopes for the expected affect interaction term between the healthy control and the current
depressed groups. For both the PA and NA models, Level 2 residual variance for the slopes and
interaction term (u1j, u2j, and u3j) were extremely close to 0 and removed from the models to
allow them to run efficiently.
For PA, the interaction term did not significantly predict the likelihood of not making an
anticipated decision in the healthy control group, 30 = 0.01, z = 0.25, p = .80 (the interaction
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terms for the depressed groups were also not significant, zs < 0.98, ps > .33). Level 2 residual
variance for the intercept (u0j) was 2.52. Further, the slope of the interaction term was not
significantly different between the remitted depressed and healthy control groups or between the
current depressed and healthy control groups, 31 = 0.02, z = 0.47, p = .64, and 32 = 0.00, z =
0.08, p = .94, respectively. The slope of the interaction term was not significantly different
between the remitted and current depressed groups either, 31 = 0.02, z = 0.33, p = .74.
For NA, the interaction term significantly predicted the likelihood of not making an
anticipated decision in the healthy control group, 30 = -0.08, z = -2.31, p = .02 (in contrast, the
interaction terms for the depressed groups were not significant, zs < -0.44, ps > .66). Level 2
residual variance for the intercept (u0j) was 2.22. However, the slope of the interaction term was
not significantly different between the remitted depressed and healthy control groups or between
the current depressed and healthy control groups, 31 = 0.07, z = 1.65, p = .10, and 32 = 0.07, z =
1.41, p = .16, respectively. Furthermore, none of the main effects in this model were significant,
all zs < 0.95, ps > .34. The slope of the interaction term was not significantly different between
the remitted and current depressed groups either, 31 = 0.00, z = 0.13, p = .89. Because none of
the group terms were significant for expected affect level and difference interactions, these
findings do not provide support for the motivation and discrimination hypotheses.
I explored the finding that the interaction between expected NA level and expected NA
difference was significant for the healthy control group. This finding appears to be unique to the
control group, because when the current depressed or remitted depressed group was modeled as
the reference group in the model, the interaction term was not significant. The finding is plotted
in Figure 6, after logits were transformed into probabilities for the outcome of the anticipated
decision not being made. For low expected NA difference (-1 SD below the mean), as expected
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NA level increases, so does the probability of the anticipated decision not being made. For high
expected NA difference (+1 SD above the mean), as expected NA level increases, the probability
of the anticipated decision not being made decreases (i.e., the probability of the anticipated
decision being made increases). This significant interaction term in the healthy control group
does not inform my motivation and discrimination hypotheses, because these hypotheses are
specific to the depressed groups; however, this finding provides important context for how
expected affect and decision-making difficulty are linked for healthy controls.
Discussion
Although alterations in expected affect and increased decision-making difficulty have
been well-documented as problems in current MDD (Hallenbeck & Thompson, 2019; Treadway
& Zald, 2011), no study to date had investigated how expected affect and decision-making
difficulty may be linked. Furthermore, it is not clear whether decision-making difficulty
represents a state- or trait-like effect (e.g., as a scar of depression), highlighting a need for studies
to compare people experiencing current depressive episodes and people whose episodes are in
remission. The present study was the first study to utilize EMA to investigate decision-making
difficulty in depression. I assessed expected affect and decision-making difficulty for the daily
anticipated decisions of people with current depression, people with remitted depression, and
healthy controls. Aim 1 was to compare expected affect for anticipated decisions across the
current depressed, remitted depressed, and healthy control groups. Aim 2 was to compare
decision-making difficulty across the three groups. Aim 3 was to examine the associations
between expected affect and decision-making difficulty, pitting the motivation hypothesis against
the discrimination hypothesis (and their interaction) in explaining these associations for the
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depressed groups. In addition to these aims, correlations among expected affect variables further
elucidate the dynamics of expected affect for decision-making in everyday life.
With Aim 1, I found that, when averaged across anticipated decision options, expected
PA level did not differ by group. In contrast, I found that the current depressed group reported a
higher expected NA level than both the remitted depressed group and the healthy control group.
However, when current anxiety disorder was accounted for, only the difference between the
current depressed group and healthy control group remained, which implies that current anxiety
disorder was partially driving the initial group difference between the current and remitted
depressed groups. These affect findings only partially support my hypotheses that there would be
lower expected PA and higher expected NA for anticipated decisions in both of the clinical
groups. With regard to the current depressed group, the lack of a difference in expected PA with
the control group is not consistent with the broader affective forecasting and pleasure literature
on current MDD (e.g., MacLeod & Salaminiou, 2001; Wu et al., 2017; Zetsche et al., 2019).
With regard to the remitted depressed group, the lack of a difference in both expected PA and
NA is also not consistent with the main study on affective forecasting in remitted MDD
(Thompson et al., 2017). It is possible that depressed participants may expect lower PA and
higher NA for their general mood over the span of a week (a typical time frame assessed in
affective forecasting studies) or for daily activities that are “looked forward to” (Wu et al., 2017),
but not for daily decisions. Given that the focus was on decisions that were anticipated to be
made each day, it is likely that my study design pulled more for decisions already involving
higher expected PA and lower expected NA. Even so, the current depressed group still reported
higher expected NA for decisions compared to the healthy control group. Thus, this alteration in
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expected affect may represent a state-like effect that occurs in the context of a depressive episode
(but see below for discussion on longitudinal studies).
With Aim 2, I found that there were no group differences in decision-making difficulty
for anticipated decisions, which was operationalized as not making anticipated decisions. With
regard to current depression, this finding stands in contrast to my hypotheses and the literature
suggesting that decision-making difficulty is pervasive in current MDD (e.g., Hallenbeck &
Thompson, 2019). The finding also suggests that decision-making difficulty is not a problem in
remitted depression, which was a question explored in this study, given the limited and mixed
findings in the literature on this population (e.g., Nakano et al., 2014; Pulcu et al., 2015, Yang et
al., 2014). It is possible that people with depression do not experience decision-making difficulty
for everyday decisions. Indeed, in my review on MDD (Hallenbeck & Thompson, 2019),
although there was evidence of decision-making difficulty across areas of decision-making, there
were also null findings within some of these areas—most notably, for social decision-making.
For social decision-making, the decision-making difficulty was reflected in decisions involving
reciprocity, with MDD being associated with lower degree of choosing to cooperate with others
(e.g., Pulcu et al., 2015). However, there were primarily null findings with regard to other
aspects of social decision-making, including decisions to trust others (e.g., Pruess et al., 2016)
and decisions to accept unfair offers from others (e.g., Gradin et al., 2015); moreover, there was
preliminary evidence that MDD was associated with enhanced decision-making with regard to
the evaluation of others (e.g., Ferguson, 1989). Given that there was approximately 25% of
decisions with a social component in the present study, it is possible that the study picked up on
intact facets of social decision-making (i.e., related to trust and fairness), which would further
explain the overall null findings on decision-making difficulty. The study could have also picked
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up on a variety of social decision-making facets (including decreased cooperation and enhanced
evaluation in MDD), and these effects could have canceled one another out.
In addition, the way that decision-making difficulty was operationalized likely
contributed to the null findings. MDD was previously found to be associated with a greater, selfreported tendency to procrastinate decisions (Alexander et al., 2017), as part of indecisiveness. In
this study, the outcome of making fewer anticipated decisions was positively correlated with an
overall measure of indecisiveness (as a specific type of decision-making difficulty). However,
the effect was small, indicating that making fewer anticipated decisions may be peripherally
related to indecisiveness. In contrast to the Alexander et al. (2017) study, my outcome measure
was more behavioral, capturing the decision-making process as it unfolds, and may represent a
greater extreme (i.e., not making decisions at all versus delaying decisions), which likely set a
high threshold to qualify for decision-making difficulty. Furthermore, as part of the EMA
protocol, the process of identifying an anticipated decision with one’s top two options may have
increased the likelihood of subsequently making the decision. It is notable that, despite the lack
of statistical significance, there was a trend in the hypothesized direction for the current
depressed group, which had a higher likelihood of not making anticipated decisions compared to
the healthy control group. The remitted depressed group also had a higher likelihood of not
making decisions compared to the healthy control group; this value fell in between the values for
the current depressed and healthy control groups. These trends suggest that a less conservative
measure of decision-making difficulty might have further drawn out differences between the
three groups.
With Aim 3, I investigated whether the association between expected affect and decisionmaking difficulty varied across the three groups. For example, even though there were no group
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differences in decision-making difficulty, it is possible that the current depressed group had a
stronger association between expected NA level and decision-making difficulty than did the
other two groups. Such a finding would have supported the motivation hypothesis, which was
centered on expected affect levels. In contrast, expected affect difference as a significant
predictor in the depressed group(s) would have supported the discrimination hypothesis; a
significant interaction between expected affect level and difference in the depressed group(s)
would have supported both hypotheses. Contrary to both hypotheses, I did not find significant
group differences in the association between expected affect and decision-making difficulty.
The null findings for group differences in the association between expected affect and
decision-making difficulty may be partly due to the operationalization of decision-making
difficulty, as discussed above. An additional explanation is that expected affect alone may not be
enough to predict decision-making difficulty; that is, this study may have missed moderators that
are salient in depression, such as rumination or expected effort, which future studies could assess
as part of EMA surveys. Rumination—defined as negative, self-focused, and repetitive
thinking—has been linked to decision-making difficulty at least in non-clinical samples (Di
Schiena et al., 2013; van Ranbenborgh et al., 2010) and could lead individuals to get caught in a
negative cycle of thinking that takes cognitive resources away from decision-making. A lower
willingness to expend effort for rewards has been consistently found in current MDD (compared
to healthy controls; Treadway et al., 2012; Yang et al., 2014; Yang et al., 2016) and may result in
decreased motivation for decision-making. It is possible that alterations in expected affect (e.g.,
high expected NA levels) produce decision-making difficulty primarily when depressed
individuals are ruminating (e.g., about similar decisions in the past) or when they expect that
taking actions to carry out future decision options is particularly effortful.
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Although there were no group differences in the association between expected affect and
decision-making difficulty, investigating Aim 3 revealed a significant interaction between
expected NA level and expected NA difference in predicting decision-making difficulty in the
healthy control group only. Specifically, when expected NA difference is small (between
decision options), as expected NA level increases (across decision options), so does the
probability of an anticipated decision not being made. Conversely, when expected NA difference
is large (between decision options), as expected NA level increases (across decision options), the
probability of an anticipated decision not being made decreases (i.e., the probability of a decision
being made increases). I did not have a priori hypotheses about the dynamics of expected affect
in the healthy control group, but these findings make sense from the standpoint of considering
expected NA to represent the subjective value (or “badness”) of the options: When both options
are similarly “bad” and intense, there may not be much incentive to make the decision; when two
options are intense but one is clearly more “bad” than the other, there is a clear better choice and
there may be more incentive to make the decision to avoid the less desirable option. Moreover,
given that the outcome was not making anticipated decisions, it makes sense that expected NA
rather than PA was the predictor, as expected NA is linked to avoidance behavior (e.g., Trew,
2011). This interaction may represent flexibility in how healthy controls use information from
expected affect to approach decision-making, which is likely adaptive; the lack of this interaction
in the clinical groups may signal that something in this process has gone awry or that there are
other factors are in the picture that were not accounted for (e.g., rumination).
In addition to the expected affect interaction in predicting decision-making difficulty in
the healthy control group, the within- and between-person correlations among the expected affect
variables further elucidate affect dynamics in all three groups. First, for all three groups, within-
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and between-person correlations between expected PA level and expected NA level, and
between expected PA difference and expected NA difference, were positive. This positive
correlation is consistent with decision-making literature showing that benefits and risks tend to
be positively associated (Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000; Slovic & Peters, 2006).
For example, activities that bring great benefit may be high or low in risk, whereas activities that
are low in benefit are unlikely to be high in risk (Finucane et al., 2000). The present study
suggests that these benefit and risk findings can be extended into and reflected by ratings of
expected PA and NA, respectively.
Second, for all three groups, within- and between-person correlations between expected
PA level and expected PA difference were negative. In contrast, for all groups except for the
current depressed group (for which the correlations were not significant), within- and betweenperson correlations between expected NA level and expected NA difference were positive. To
my knowledge, this was the first study to examine the relation between expected affect level and
expected affect difference for decisions. I speculate that the direction of the correlation is
different for PA versus NA because it is adaptive. Level and difference are negatively linked for
PA because, from an approach perspective, it may be more important to discriminate between
lower (versus higher) levels of PA in order to start to move towards beneficial decision options.
Level and difference are positively linked for NA because, from an avoidance perspective, it may
be more important to discriminate between higher (versus lower) levels of NA in order to move
away from detrimental decision options. The lack of a significant correlation between level and
difference for NA in the current depressed group may be another sign that something in this
process has gone awry, which may be especially problematic given that NA level was higher in
this group when compared to the others.
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Although this study had several strengths (e.g., use of EMA to assess real life decisions,
high compliance rate for EMA surveys, inclusion of both current and remitted depressed groups,
testing mechanistic hypotheses related to affect and decision-making), there is another limitation
that is important to note in addition to study design. As discussed above, the wording of the
anticipated decision EMA item may have biased the results, such that alterations in expected
affect and decision-making difficulty were not fully captured in the depressed groups. In
addition, some of the analyses involving the binary decision-making difficulty outcome may
have been underpowered. Moinedden et al. (2007) found in their simulation study that a low
prevalence rate of the binary outcome (i.e., 10%) in multilevel models exacerbated biases of
model intercepts and coefficients; specifically, for Level 1 units equal to five, biases rose as high
as 12% (which was above the recommended cutoff of 5%) for the fixed effects in the model.
Given that the percentage of anticipated decisions not made was 12.6% in my overall sample, the
lower prevalence rate of my outcome means that a larger sample size would have been ideal to
detect significant effects.
There are several directions that I think would be valuable for future research to pursue.
First and foremost, before concluding that decision-making difficulty for decisions in everyday
life is not present in current or remitted depression, it will be important for future EMA studies to
test out different designs. I had chosen the framework of assessing anticipated decisions to
attempt to capture decision-making as it unfolds in real time and thus reduce any negative biases
in retrospective recall characteristic of depression (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010). An alternative that
might pull for decisions in which there is more difficulty could be similar to what Bjälkebring et
al. (2016) did; in their study, which was not focused on depression, they asked participants to
reflect on a decision they had thought about in the past 24 hours but had not made. Under this
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design, it is likely that, compared to healthy controls, people with current depression would not
only report higher expected NA but also report greater decision-making difficulty for such
decisions. In addition to having an outcome of whether the decision was made, it would be
beneficial to include a self-report item of decision-making difficulty (e.g., rating the extent to
which “This decision was difficult” is true) for decisions that are made; multiple outcomes, both
behavioral and self-report, would allow for probing the nuances of decision-making difficulty in
everyday life. It would also be informative to see if specific types of decisions are more likely to
elicit difficulty than others in depression. As discussed above, aspects of social decision-making
(e.g., related to fairness and trust) have not been found to be impaired in MDD. In contrast,
work-related decisions (e.g., related to one’s job, school, or chores) may be perceived to require
more effort to carry out; this area may be where one is most likely to see an interactive effect
between alterations in expected affect (e.g., higher expected NA) and expected effort in
producing decision-making difficulty. A future study could assess the content of decisions
through including a checklist of topics in the EMA survey.
With regard to a final future direction, it is worth noting the cross-sectional nature of the
current study, which did not follow individuals with current and remitted depression over time.
Having current depressed, remitted depressed, and healthy control groups allows one to draw
indirect evidence of whether a finding represents a state- or trait-like effect (e.g., a scar) in
depression. For example, because it was characteristic of the current depressed group only,
heightened expected NA for anticipated decisions may represent a state-like effect. This could be
confirmed through subsequent longitudinal studies if these studies follow the same individuals
and show that the alteration in affect diminishes after their depressive episodes remit, which
would more conclusively rule out the scar hypothesis. Additionally, to further confirm that
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heightened expected NA for anticipated decisions is a state-like effect, prospective longitudinal
studies that follow individuals at increased risk for depression would be needed. If heightened
expected NA for decisions does not predict the onset of a future depressive episode, this effect
would truly be constrained to current episodes only.
In sum, the present study adds to the MDD literature by providing preliminary findings
on affect and decision-making difficulty in everyday life. Although no group differences were
found for decision-making difficulty, or for the association between expected affect and
decision-making difficulty, heightened expected NA for anticipated decisions stood out for the
current depressed group, compared to the remitted depressed and healthy control groups.
Furthermore, the dynamics of expected affect for anticipated decisions, conceptualized as mean
levels across decision options and as difference scores between decision options, were elucidated
for all three groups, which may provide helpful context upon which any future group differences
related to depression are found. Continuing to gain a better understanding of whether and how
expected affect, as well as other factors such as rumination and expected effort, leads to
decision-making difficulty could inform treatment targets for this debilitating symptom in MDD.
General Discussion
Decision-making difficulty has been found to be a prevalent and impairing symptom of
MDD. In my dissertation, I sought to build upon my review paper that found evidence of
decision-making difficulty in MDD across multiple research areas (i.e., indecisiveness, decisionmaking under uncertainty, intertemporal choice, social decision-making, and effort-based
decision-making; see Table 1) and organized these findings into a model of decision-making
difficulty that highlighted the role of affective factors, including expected affect (see Figure 1;
Hallenbeck & Thompson, 2019). In Study 1, I focused on one area of decision-making
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difficulty—indecisiveness—and sought to gain clarity on this construct and to confirm its
association with depressive symptoms, as well as with situational indecision. In Study 2, I
focused on one link in my model of decision-making difficulty in MDD, examining whether
alterations in expected affect were associated with decision-making difficulty for the daily
decisions of people with current or remitted depression.
In Study 1, I administered self-report questionnaires of indecisiveness and depressive
symptoms and a behavioral task of indecision to a large sample of adults recruited online. I used
CFA, a theory-driven approach to factor analysis, to investigate the dimensionality of
indecisiveness (Aim 1) and to test associations among indecisiveness, depressive symptoms, and
indecision (Aim 2). I made the argument that the straightforwardly worded items and reversescored items from two widely used indecisiveness questionnaires represent indecisiveness and
decision-making confidence, respectively. The meaning of reverse-scored items was not
examined in previous studies of dimensionality and likely played a role in the mixed findings for
indecisiveness. After decision confidence was accounted for, indecisiveness showed a strong
positive association with depressive symptoms, which confirms and extends prior findings in this
area that had studied indecisiveness and depression in a piecemeal fashion. Importantly, Study 1
contributed to the broader literature by shedding light on how the assessment of indecisiveness
can be improved and by helping to validate the construct of indecisiveness through a positive
association with in-the-moment indecision. Through refining the assessment of indecisiveness,
this study may pave the way for future researchers to continue to iron out the dimensionality of
indecisiveness and to examine indecisiveness and indecision in a clinical MDD sample.
In Study 2, I used the EMA method to assess the daily anticipated decisions of people
with current depression, people with remitted depression, and healthy controls. I used multilevel
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modeling, a powerful method for estimating both between- and within-person effects in nested
data, to investigate group differences in expected affect (Aim 1) and decision-making difficulty
(Aim 2) for anticipated decisions and to investigate the mechanism (i.e., relating to motivation
versus discrimination) through which expected affect and decision-making difficulty are related
(Aim 3). Although there were no group differences in decision-making difficulty, higher levels
of expected NA for anticipated decisions stood out for the current depressed group, compared to
the other two groups. There were also no group differences in the association between expected
affect and decision-making difficulty. The lack of consistent group differences may signify that
there was a high threshold to meet for decision-making difficulty in this study, with the EMA
questions pulling for decisions that were anticipated to be made and with a behavioral index of
decision-making difficulty (i.e., decisions not made). Furthermore, intact social decision-making
processes (e.g., related to trust and fairness) in MDD were likely picked up by EMA and may
further explain the null group differences. Outside of investigating group differences, this study
elucidated the dynamics of expected affect for anticipated decisions, outlining the relations
between levels of and differences in both expected PA and NA and outlining an interactive effect
between NA level and NA difference for healthy controls specifically. These findings provide
context for understanding the interplay of affect and decision-making in everyday life and may
set the stage for future EMA studies on decision-making and depression.
The presence of NA in decision-making in depression is a common thread through Study
1 and Study 2. In Study 1, after the decision confidence items were accounted for, the remaining
indecisiveness items related to increased NA rather than decreased PA. Examples include “I
become anxious when making a decision” and “I often worry about making the wrong decision.”
In Study 2, it was increased expected NA, and not decreased expected PA, for anticipated
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decisions that distinguished the current depressed group from the remitted and healthy control
groups. It is possible that NA plays a bigger role than PA in decision-making difficulty in
depression. In addition to the cardinal symptom of sadness, individuals with MDD also
experience high levels of other negative emotions including anger, regret, and hopelessness
(Abramson, Metalsky, & Alloy, 1989; Cassiello-Robbins & Barlow, 2016; Kraines, Krug, &
Wells, 2017). Studies have started to explore the effects of specific negative emotions on
decision-making in depression. For example, in the research area of intertemporal choice, the
decision-making difficulty in MDD is reflected in having higher discounting of future rewards—
that is, compared to healthy controls, depressed individuals tend to choose smaller, more
immediate rewards in lieu of larger, more delayed rewards (Hallenbeck & Thompson, 2019).
Higher discounting of future rewards in MDD was specifically associated with increased
hopelessness, controlling for general levels of depressive symptoms (Pulcu et al., 2014). It may
be especially fruitful for future research to hone in on and continue to round out the story for
negative affect in decision-making in depression.
Another common thread through Study 1 and Study 2 is that both studies touch on
indecisiveness as the research area of decision-making that was investigated. Study 1 focuses on
indecisiveness explicitly and thoroughly examines the construct through self-report
questionnaires and a behavioral task. Study 2 relates to indecisiveness more tangentially: The
outcome of decision-making difficulty, not making anticipated decisions in daily life, was
conceptually related to a feature of indecisiveness (i.e., procrastinating decisions). Because Study
2 was the first EMA study to look at everyday decision-making difficulty in depression, my
conceptualization was agnostic as to which research area of decision-making this fell under. For
an EMA study to be squarely focused on indecisiveness, I think that additional outcome
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measures are needed (e.g., a self-report of decision-making difficulty) and a greater range of
decisions (e.g., varying in content, impact on one’s life) assessed.
Furthermore, there were many factors that may have played a role in Study 2, that could
have qualified the study as falling under a different area of decision-making. One group of
factors relate to social decision-making (i.e., decisions related to reciprocity, fairness, trust, and
evaluation of others), for which past findings on depression are nuanced, with the finding (i.e.,
difficulty with decision-making, null, or enhanced decision-making) depending on the specific
factor studied (Hallenbeck & Thompson, 2019). Because several of the daily decisions in Study
2 involved a social component, it is likely that the study touched on these processes. Moreover,
researchers are starting to use decision-making tasks to explore additional social processes in
depression, including social avoidance (i.e., avoidance of social situations), which is emerging as
another facet of decision-making difficulty (Fernández-Theoduloz et al., 2019). It is clear that a
fine-grained approach will be necessary to understand the role of social processes in daily
decision-making. In contrast to knowing whether Study 2 decisions had a social component,
there were other decision-making factors that were not assessed, such as uncertainty and time
delay for decision outcomes. These could have qualified the study as falling under decisionmaking under uncertainty and intertemporal choice, respectively. Overall, such factors may be
harder to isolate in a naturalistic EMA design, compared to being able to manipulate them in the
laboratory. However, it would be worthwhile for future research to continue to explore the
complexity of decision-making in everyday life, especially for social decisions, and to elucidate
the factors that are most relevant to depression.
Given that one of the two studies found evidence of decision-making difficulty, it is
important to consider treatment implications for depression. Study 1 suggests that indecisiveness
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is prominent for people with higher (versus lower) levels of depressive symptoms, which is also
reflected in prolonged decision times (i.e., as part of indecision); however, Study 2 suggests that
people with MDD still ultimately make their decisions (at least when these decisions are
anticipated). Thus, the key may lie in helping people to increase their efficiency with making
decisions (e.g., reducing procrastination, decision times) and to decrease distress associated with
decisions (e.g., higher NA). Although no treatment for depression explicitly addresses
indecisiveness, empirically-supported treatments such as cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT;
Beck et al., 1979) and acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT; Hayes, Luoma, Bond,
Masuda, & Lillis, 2006) likely indirectly target indecisiveness through conceptualizing
indecisiveness as part of avoidance. Similar to avoidance, indecisiveness may have the
paralyzing effect of delaying future negative outcomes while also delaying future positive
outcomes. For example, a depressed client may put off a decision about whether to call back a
friend; calling the friend could cause additional stress (e.g., in the form of pressure to explain
one’s low mood) but could result in gaining emotional support, which would be helpful to have
earlier rather than later in the course of a depressive episode. A CBT approach can help
depressed clients to evaluate and test their expectations (e.g., through exposures) for such
decisions, which may help to increase efficiency with decision-making. Furthermore, an ACT
approach can encourage acceptance (rather than avoidance) of distressing emotions related to
decision-making, especially when decisions align with one’s personal values. Keeping an eye on
reducing indecisiveness as part of these treatments could help to alleviate other depressive
symptoms (e.g., feelings of guilt) and enhance overall functioning and quality of life.
Future research may benefit from using my model of decision-making difficulty in MDD
to continue to refine our understanding of this symptom (Hallenbeck & Thompson, 2019). There
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is still much work to be done on elucidating the nature of decision-making difficulty in MDD.
Although there is evidence of difficulty across areas of decision-making in current MDD, the
story is clearly nuanced, with evidence of intact decision-making within some of these areas; one
such area may be decision-making in daily life for anticipated decisions with relatively minor
impact. Ruling out aspects of intact decision-making should allow researchers to better focus on
impairing areas of decision-making difficulty (e.g., indecisiveness) and to investigate the factors
(e.g., related to NA, rumination, and effort) that may contribute to these areas of difficulty in
current MDD. Furthermore, using these areas of decision-making difficulty in current MDD as a
guide, it will be useful to continue to investigate the extent to which decision-making difficulty is
present after MDD remits (as a scar of MDD), as well as the extent to which it represents a risk
factor before the onset of MDD. A comprehensive and targeted approach to studying decisionmaking difficulty may ultimately help to propel future advances in the knowledge and treatment
of MDD.

89

References
Abramson, L. Y., Metalsky, G. I., & Alloy, L. B. (1989). Hopelessness depression: A theorybased subtype of depression. Psychological Review, 96, 358-372.
http://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.96.2.358
Alexander, L. F., Oliver, A., Burdine, L. K., Tang, Y., & Dunlop, B. W. (2017). Reported
maladaptive decision-making in unipolar and bipolar depression and its change with
treatment. Psychiatry Research, 257, 386-392.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.psychres.2017.08.004
American Psychiatric Association. (2013). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders
(5th ed.). Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association.
https://doi.org/10.1176/appi.books.9780890425596
Anderson, C. (2003). The psychology of doing nothing: Forms of decision avoidance result from
reason and emotion. Psychological Bulletin, 129, 139-167. https://doi.org/10.1037/00332909.129.1.139
Bacanli, F. (2006). Personality characteristics as predictors of personal indecisiveness. Journal of
Career Development, 32, 320-332. https://doi.org/10.1177/0894845305282941
Bai, H. (2018, August 8). Evidence that A Large Amount of Low Quality Responses on MTurk
Can Be Detected with Repeated GPS Coordinates [blog post]. Retrieved
from: https://www.maxhuibai.com/blog/evidence-that-responses-from-repeating-gps-arerandom
Bandalos, D. L. (2002). The effects of item parceling on goodness-of-fit and parameter estimate
bias on structural equation modeling. Structural Equation Modeling, 9, 78-102.
https://doi.org/10.1207/S15328007SEM0901_5

90

Bates, D., Maechler, M., Bolker, B., & Walker, S. (2015). Fitting linear mixed-effects models
using lme4. Journal of Statistical Software, 67, 1-48.
https://doi.org/10.18637/jss.v067.i01
Baumeister, R. F., Vohs, K. D., DeWall, C. N., & Zhang, L. (2007). How emotion shapes
behavior: Feedback, anticipation, and reflection, rather than direct causation. Personality
and Social Psychology Review, 11, 167-203. https://doi.org/10.1177/1088868307301033
Beck, A. T., Rush, A., Shaw, B. F., & Emery, G. (1979). Cognitive therapy of depression. New
York, NY: The Guilford Press.
Bentler, P. M. (1990). Comparative fit indexes in structural models. Psychological Bulletin, 107,
238-246. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.107.2.238
Bjälkebring, P., Västfjäll, D., Svenson, O., & Slovic, P. (2016). Regulation of experienced and
anticipated regret in daily decision making. Emotion, 16, 381-386.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0039861
Brouwer, D., Meijer, R. R., & Zevalkink, J. (2013). On the factor structure of the Beck
Depression Inventory-II: G is the key. Psychological Assessment, 25, 136-145.
https://doi.org/10.1037/a0029228
Brown, T. (2015). Confirmatory factor analysis for applied research (2nd ed.). New York, NY:
The Guilford Press.
Browne, M. W., & Cudeck, R. (1993). Alternative ways of assessing model fit. In K. A. Bollen
& J. S. Long (Eds.), Testing structural equation models (pp. 136-162). Newbury Park,
CA: Sage.
Bruine de Bruin, W., Dombrovski, A. Y., Parker, A. M., & Szanto, K. (2016). Late-life
depression, suicidal ideation, and attempted suicide: The role of individual differences in

91

maximizing, regret, and negative decision outcomes. Journal of Behavioral DecisionMaking, 29, 363-371. https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.1882
Buhrmester, M., Kwang, T., & Gosling, S. D. (2011). Amazon’s Mechanical Turk: A new source
of inexpensive, yet high-quality, data? Perspectives on Psychological Science, 6, 3-5.
https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691610393980
Burcasa, S. L., & Iacono, W. G. (2007). Risk for recurrence in depression. Clinical Psychology
Review, 27, 959-985. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpr.2007.02.005
Cassiello-Robbins, C., & Barlow, D. H. (2016). Anger: The unrecognized emotion in emotional
disorders. Clinical Psychology Science and Practice, 23, 66-85.
https://doi.org/10.1111/cpsp.12139
Cheek, N. N., & Goebel, J. (2020). What does it mean to maximize? “Decision difficulty,”
indecisiveness, and the jingle-jangle fallacies in the measurement of maximizing.
Judgment and Decision Making, 15, 7-24.
Chen, F. F., Hayes, A., Carver, C. S., Laurenceau, J. P., & Zhang, Z. (2012). Modeling general
and specific variance in multifaceted constructs: A comparison of the bifactor model to
other approaches. Journal of Personality, 80, 219-251. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.14676494.2011.00739.x
Cohen, J. (1988). Statistical power analysis for the behavioral sciences. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Cooper, S. E., Fuqua, D. R., & Hartman, B. W. (1984). The relationship of trait indecisiveness to
vocational uncertainty, career indecision, and interpersonal characteristics. Journal of
College Student Personnel, 25, 353-356.

92

Costello, A. B., & Osborne, J. W. (2005). Best practices in exploratory factor analysis: Four
recommendations for getting the most from your analysis. Practical Assessment,
Research, & Evaluation, 10. https://doi.org/10.7275/jyj1-4868
Desender, K., Boldt, A., & Yeung, N. (2018). Subjective confidence predicts information
seeking in decision making. Psychological Science, 29, 761-778.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797617744771
Di Fabio, A., & Palazzeschi, L. (2012). Incremental variance of the core self-evaluation
construct compared to fluid intelligence and personality traits in aspects of decisionmaking. Personality and Individual Differences, 53, 196-201.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2012.03.012
Di Fabio, A., Palazzeschi, L., Asulin-Peretz, L., & Gati, I. (2013). Career indecision versus
indecisiveness: Associations with personality traits and emotional intelligence. Journal of
Career Assessment, 21, 42-56. https://doi.org/10.1177/1069072712454698
Di Schiena, R., Luminet, O., Chang, B., & Phippot, P. (2013). Why are depressive individuals
indecisive? Different modes of rumination account for indecision in non-clinical
depression. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 37, 713-724.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10608-012-9517-9
Elaydi, R. (2006). Construct development and measurement of indecisiveness. Management
Decision, 44, 1363-1376. https://doi.org/10.1108/00251740610715696
Ferguson, T. (1989). Who solved the secretary problem? Statistical Science, 4, 292-289.
http://doi.org/10.1214/ss/1177012496
Fernández-Theoduloz, G., Paz, V., Nicolaisen-Sobesky, Pérez, A., Buunk, A. P., Cabana, A., &
Gradin, V. B. (2019). Social avoidance in depression: A study using a social decision-

93

making task. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 128, 234-244.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/abn0000415
Ferrari, J. R. (1994). Dysfunctional procrastination and its relationship with self-esteem,
interpersonal dependency, and self-defeating behaviors. Personality and Individual
Differences, 17, 673-679. https://doi.org/10.1016/0191-8869(94)90140-6
Finucane, M. L., Alhakami, A., Slovic, P., & Johnson, S. M. (2000). The affect heuristic in
judgments of risks and benefits. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 13, 1-17.
https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1099-0771(200001/03)13:1<1::AID-BDM333>3.0.CO;2-S
First, M. B., Williams, J. B. W., Karg, K. S., & Spitzer, R. L. (2015). Structured Clinical
Interview for DSM-5 – Research Version. Arlington, VA: American Psychiatric
Association.
Frost, R. O., & Shows, D. L. (1993). The nature and measurement of compulsive indecisiveness.
Behaviour Research and Therapy, 31, 683-692. https://doi.org/10.1016/00057967(93)90121-A
Germeijs, V., & De Boeck, P. (2002). A measurement scale for indecisiveness and its
relationship to career indecision and other types of indecision. European Journal of
Psychological Assessment, 18, 113-122. https://doi.org/10.1027//1015-5759.18.2.113
Germeijs, V., & Verschueren, K. (2011). Indecisiveness and big five personality factors:
Relationship and specificity. Personality and Individual Differences, 50, 1023-1028.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2011.01.017
Gomez, R., & McLaren, S. (2015). The Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale:
Support for a bifactor model with a dominant general factor and a specific factor for
positive affect. Assessment, 22, 351-360. https://doi.org/10.1177/1073191114545357

94

Gotlib, I. H., & Joormann, J. (2010). Cognition and depression: Current status and future
directions. Annual Review of Clinical Psychology, 6, 285-312.
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.clinpsy.121208.131305
Gradin, V. B., Pérez, A., Macfarlane, J. A., Cavin, I., Waiter, G., Engelmann, J., Dritschel, B.,
Pomi, A., Matthews, K., & Steele, J. D. (2015). Abnormal brain responses to social
fairness in depression: An fMRI study using the Ultimatum Game. Psychological
Medicine, 45, 1241-1251. http://doi.org/10.1017/S0033291714002347
Guillemin, F., Bombardier, C., & Beaton, D. (1993). Cross-cultural adaptation of health-related
quality of life measures: Literature review and proposed guidelines. Journal of Clinical
Epidemiology, 12, 1417-1432. https://doi.org/10.1016/0895-4356(93)90142-N
Hallenbeck, H. W., & Thompson, R. J. (2019). Decision-making difficulty in major depressive
disorder: An integrative review and model informed by affect. Manuscript under review.
Hayes, S. C., Luoma, J. B., Bond, F. W., Masuda, A., & Lillis, J. (2006). Acceptance and
Commitment Therapy: Model, processes and outcomes. Behaviour Research and
Therapy, 44, 1-25. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.brat.2005.06.006
Hein, S., Bonsignore, M., Barkow, K., Jessen, F., Ptok, U., & Heun, R. (2003). Lifetime
depressive and somatic symptoms as preclinical markers of late-onset depression.
European Archives of Psychiatry and Clinical Neuroscience, 253, 16-21.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00406-003-0399-4
Hoerger, M., Quirk, S. W., Chapman, B. P., & Duberstein, P. R. (2012). Affective forecasting
and self-rated symptoms of depression, anxiety, and hypomania: Evidence for a
dysphoric forecasting bias. Cognition and Emotion, 26, 1098-1106.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02699931.2011.631985

95

Holzinger, K. J., & Swineford, F. (1937). The bifactor method. Psychometrika, 2, 41-54.
https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02287965
Hu, L., & Bentler, P. M. (1999). Cutoff criteria for fit indices in covariance structure analysis:
Conventional criteria versus new alternative. Structural Equation Modeling, 6, 1-55.
https://doi.org/10.1080/10705519909540118
IBM. (2017). SPSS Statistics for Macintosh (Version 25.0) [Computer software]. Armonk, NY:
Author.
Kepecs, A., Uchida, N., Zariwala, H. W., & Mainen, Z. F. (2008). Neural correlates,
computation and behavioural impact of decision confidence. Nature, 455, 227-231.
https://doi.org/10.1038/nature07200
Kline, R. B. (2011). Principles and practice of structural equation modeling (3rd ed.). New
York, NY: The Guilford Press.
Kraines, M. A., Krug, C. P., & Wells, T. T. (2017). Decision justification theory in depression:
Regret and self-blame. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 41, 556-561.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10608-017-9836-y
Kring, A. M., & Elis, O. (2013). Emotion deficits in people with schizophrenia. Annual Review
of Clinical Psychology, 9, 409-433. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-clinpsy-050212185538
Krull, J. L., & MacKinnon, D. P. (2001). Multilevel modeling of individual and group level
mediated effects. Multivariate Behavioral Research, 36, 249–277.
https://doi.org/10.1207/S15327906MBR3602_06
Lauderdale, S. A., Martin, K. J., & Moore, J. (2019). Aversive indecisiveness predicts risks for
and symptoms of anxiety and depression over avoidant indecisiveness. Journal of

96

Rational-Emotive & Cognitive-Behavior Therapy, 1-22. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10942018-0302-x
Lerner, J. S., Li, Y., Valdesolo, P., & Kassam, K. S. (2015). Emotion and decision-making.
Annual Reviews of Psychology, 66, 799-823. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych010213-115043
Leykin, Y., & DeRubeis, R. J. (2010). Decision-making styles and depressive symptomatology:
Development of the decision styles questionnaire. Judgment and Decision-Making, 5,
506-515.
Little, T. D., Cunningham, W. A., Shahar, G., & Widaman, K. F. (2002). To parcel or not to
parcel: Exploring the question, weighing the merits. Structural Equation Modeling, 9,
151–173. https://doi.org/10.1207/S15328007SEM0902_1
Loewenstein, G., & Lerner, J. S. (2003). The role of affect in decision-making. In R. J.
Davidson, H. H. Goldsmith, & K. R. Scherer (Eds.), Handbook of affective sciences (pp.
619-642). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Maas, C. J. M., & Hox, J. J. (2005). Sufficient sample sizes for multilevel modeling.
Methodology, 1, 86-92. https://doi.org/10.1027/1614-2241.1.3.86
MacCallum, R. C., Browne, M. W., & Sugawara, H. M. (1996). Power analysis and
determination of sample size for covariance structure modeling. Psychological Methods,
1, 130-149. https://doi.org/10.1037/1082-989X.1.2.130
MacLeod, A. K., & Salaminiou, E. (2001). Reduced positive future-thinking in depression:
Cognitive and affective factors. Cognition and Emotion, 15, 99-107.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02699930125776

97

Maddox, W. T., Gorlick, M. A., Worthy, D. A., & Beevers, C. G. (2012). Depressive symptoms
enhance loss-minimization, but attenuate gain-maximization in history-dependent
decision-making. Cognition, 125, 118-124.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2012.06.011
Mathersul, D. C., & Ruscio, A. M. (2020). Forecasting the future, remembering the past:
Misrepresentations of daily emotional experience in generalized anxiety disorder and
major depressive disorder. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 44, 73-88.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10608-019-10048-5
Mellers, B. A. (2000). Choice and the relative pleasure of consequences. Psychological Bulletin,
126, 910-924. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.126.6.910
Mitchell, A. J., McGlinchey, J. B., Young, D., Chelminski, I., & Zimmerman, M. (2009).
Accuracy of specific symptoms in the diagnosis of major depressive disorder in
psychiatric outpatients: Data from the MIDAS project. Psychological Medicine, 39,
1107-1116. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0033291708004674
Moineddin, R., Matheson, F. I., & Glazier, R. H. (2007). A simulation study of sample size for
multilevel logistic regression models. BMC Medical Research Methodology, 7, 1-10.
https://doi.org/10.1186/1471-2288-7-34
Muhtadie, L., Akinola, M., Koslov, K., & Berry Mendes, W. (2015). Vagal flexibility: A
physiological predictor of social sensitivity. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 109, 106-120. https://doi.org/10.1037/pspp0000016
Murphy, F. C., Rubinsztein, J. S., Michael, A., Rogers, R. D., Robbins, T. W., Paykel, E. S., &
Sahakian, B. J. (2001). Decision-making cognition in mania and depression.
Psychological Medicine, 31, 679-693. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0033291701003804

98

Murray, A. L., & Johnson, W. (2013). The limitations of model fit when comparing the bi-factor
versus higher-order models of human cognitive ability structure. Intelligence, 41, 407422. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.intell.2013.06.004
Muthén, L. K., & Muthén, B. O. (2002). How to use a Monte Carlo study to decide on sample
size and determine power. Structural Equation Modeling, 4, 599-620.
https://doi.org/10.1207/s15328007sem0904_8
Muthén, L. K., & Muthén, B. O. (1998-2017). Mplus user’s guide (8th ed.). Los Angeles, CA:
Muthén & Muthén.
Nakano, M., Matsuo, K., Nakashima, M., Matsubara, T., Harada, K., Egashira, K., Masaki, H.,
Takahashi, K., & Watanabe, Y. (2014). Gray matter volume and rapid decision-making in
major depressive disorder. Progress in Neuro-Psychopharmacology & Biological
Psychiatry, 48, 51-56. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pnpbp.2013.09.011
Nezlek, J. B. (2012). Multilevel modeling of diary-style data. In M. R. Mehl, & T. S. Conner
(Eds.), Handbook of research methods for studying daily life (pp. 357-383). New York,
NY: Guilford Press.
Nezlek, J. B. (2017). A practical guide to understanding reliability in studies of within-person
variability. Journal of Research in Personality, 69, 149155. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2016.06.020
Nierenberg, A. A., Husain, M. M., Trivedi, M. H., Fava, M., Warden, D., Wisniewski, S. R.,
Miyahara, S., & Rush, A. J. (2010). Residual symptoms after remission of major
depressive disorder with citalopram and risk of relapse: A STAR*D report. Psychological
Medicine, 40, 41-50. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0033291709006011

99

Ong, D. C., Zaki, J., & Gruber, J. (2017). Increased cooperative behavior across remitted bipolar
I disorder and major depression: Insights utilizing a behavioral economic trust game.
Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 126, 1-7. https://doi.org/10.1037/abn0000239
Osipow, S. H. (1999). Assessing career indecision. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 55, 147-154.
https://doi.org/10.1006/jvbe.1999.1704
Parkinson, B., & Simons, G. (2009). Affecting others: Social appraisal and emotion contagion in
everyday decision making. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 35, 1071-1084.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167209336611
Patalano, A. L., & LeClair, Z. (2011). The influence of group decision making on
indecisiveness-related decisional confidence. Judgment and Decision Making, 6, 163175.
Peer, E., Brandimarte, L., Samat, S., & Acquisti, A. (2017). Beyond the Turk: Alternative
platforms for crowdsourcing behavioral research. Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology, 70, 153-163. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2017.01.006
Pietromonaco, P. R., & Rook, K. S. (1987). Decision style in depression: The contribution of
perceived risks versus benefits. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 52, 399408. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.52.2.399
Potworowski, G. A. (2010). Varieties of indecisive experience: Explaining the tendency to not
make timely and subtle decisions (Doctoral dissertation). Unpublished manuscript.
Preuss, N., Brändle, L. S., Hager, O. M., Haynes, M., Fischbacher, U., & Hasler, G. (2016).
Inconsistency and social decision-making in patients with borderline personality disorder.
Psychiatry Research, 243, 115-122. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.psychres.2016.06.017

100

Pulcu, E., Thomas, E. J., Trotter, P. D., McFarquhar, M., Juhasz, G., Sahakian, B. J., Deakin, J.
F., Anderson, I. M., Zahn, R., & Elliott, R. (2015). Social-economic decision-making in
current and remitted major depression. Psychological Medicine, 45, 1301-1313.
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0033291714002414
Pulcu, E., Trotter, P. D., Thomas, E. J., McFarquhar, M., Juhasz, G., Sahakian, B. J., Deakin, J.
F., Zahn, R., Anderson, I. M., & Elliott, R. (2014). Temporal discounting in major
depressive disorder. Psychological Medicine, 44, 1825-1834.
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0033291713002584
Radford, M. H. B., Mann, L., & Kalucy, R. S. (1986). Psychiatric disturbance and decisionmaking. Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry, 20, 210-217.
https://doi.org/10.3109/00048678609161333
Radloff, L. S. (1977). The CES-D scale: A self-report depression scale for research in the general
population. Applied Psychological Measurement, 1, 385-401.
https://doi.org/10.1177/014662167700100306
Rassin, E. (2007). A psychological theory of indecisiveness. Netherlands Journal of Psychology,
63, 2-13. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03061056
Rassin, E., & Muris, P. (2005). Indecisiveness and the interpretation of ambiguous situations.
Personality and Individual Differences, 39, 1285-1291.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2005.06.006
Rassin, E., Muris, P., Franken, I., Smit, M., & Wong, M. (2007). Measuring general
indecisiveness. Journal of Psychopathology and Behavioral Assessment, 29, 61-68.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10862-006-9023-z

101

Reise, S. P., Moore, T. M., & Haviland, M. G. (2010). Bifactor models and rotations: Exploring
the extent to which multidimensional data yield univocal scale scores. Journal of
Personality Assessment, 92, 544-559. https://doi.org/10.1080/00223891.2010.496477
Reise, S. P., Morizot, J., & Hays, R. D. (2007). The role of the bifactor model in resolving
dimensionality issues in health outcomes measures. Quality of Life Research, 16, 19-31.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11136-007-9183-7
Reise, S. P., Scheines, R., Widamin, K. F., & Haviland, M. G. (2013). Multidimensionality and
structural coefficient bias in structural equation modeling: A bifactor perspective.
Educational and Psychological Measurement, 73, 5-26.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0013164412449831
Rodebaugh, T. L., Woods, C. M., & Heimberg, R. G. (2007). The reverse of social anxiety is not
always the opposite: The reverse-scored items of the Social Interaction Anxiety Scale do
not belong. Behavior Therapy, 38, 192-206. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.beth.2006.08.001
Rodebaugh, T. L., Woods, C. M., Heimberg, R. G., Leibowitz, M. R., & Schneier, F. R. (2006).
The factor structure and screening utility of the Social Interaction Anxiety Scale.
Psychological Assessment, 18, 231-237. https://doi.org/10.1037/1040-3590.18.2.231
Rodebaugh, T. L., Woods, C. M., Thissen, D. M., Heimberg, R. G., Chambless, D. L., & Rapee,
R. M. (2004). More information from fewer questions: The factor structure and item
properties of the original and brief fear of negative evaluation scale. Psychological
Assessment, 16, 169-181. https://doi.org/10.1037/1040-3590.16.2.169
Rolls, E. T., Grabenhorst, F., & Deco, G. (2010). Choice, difficulty, and confidence in the brain.
NeuroImage, 53, 694-706. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2010.06.073

102

Russell, J. A. (1980). A circumplex model of affect. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 39, 1161-1178. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/h0077714
Schafer, J. L. (1999). Multiple imputation: A primer. Statistical Methods in Medical Research, 8,
3-15. https://doi.org/10.1177/096228029900800102
Schwartz, B., Ward, A., Monterosso, J., Lyubomirsky, S., White, K., & Lehman, D. R. (2002).
Maximizing versus satisficing: Happiness is a matter of choice. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 83, 1178-1197. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.83.5.1178
Shafer, A. B. (2006). Meta-analysis of the factor structures of four depression questionnaires:
Beck, CES-D, Hamilton, and Zung. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 62, 123-146.
https://doi.org/10.1002/jclp.20213
Shenhav, A., & Buckner, R. L. (2014). Neural correlates of dueling affective reactions to winwin choices. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 111, 10978-10983.
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1405725111
Shenhav, A., Dean Wolf, C. K., & Karmarkar, U. R. (2018). The evil of banality: When
choosing between the mundane feels like choosing between the worst. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: General, 147, 1892-1904. https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0000433
Shirren, S., & Phillips, J. G. (2011). Decisional style, mood, and work communication: Email
diaries. Ergonomics, 54, 891-903. https://doi.org/10.1080/00140139.2011.609283
Skorikov, V. B., & Vandervoort, D. J. (2003). Relationships between the underlying constructs
of the Beck Depression Inventory and the Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression
Scale. Educational and Psychological Measurement, 63, 319-335.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0013164402251035

103

Slovic, P., & Peters, E. (2006). Risk perception and affect. Current Directions in Psychological
Science, 15, 322-325. https://doi-org.libproxy.wustl.edu/10.1111/j.14678721.2006.00461.x
Sniezek, J. A., & Van Swol, L. M. (2001). Trust, confidence, and expertise in a judge-advisor
system. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 84, 228-307.
https://doi.org/10.1006/obhd.2000.2926
Snijders, T. A. B., & Bosker, R. J. (2011). Multilevel analysis: An introduction to basic and
advanced multilevel modeling (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Sousa, V. D., & Rojjanasrirat, W. (2011). Translation, adaptation, and validation of instruments
or scales for use in cross-cultural health care research: A clear and user-friendly
guideline. Journal of Evaluation of Clinical Practice, 17, 268-274.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1365-2753.2010.01434.x
Spunt, R. P., Rassin, E., & Epstein, L. M. (2009). Aversive and avoidant indecisiveness: Roles
for regret proneness, maximization, and BIS/BAS sensitivities. Personality and
Individual Differences, 47, 256-261. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2009.03.009
Steiger, J. H. (1990). Structural model equation and modification: An interval estimation
approach. Multivariate Behavioral Research, 25, 173-180.
https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327906mbr2502_4
Taillefer, S. E., Liu, J. J. W., Ornstein, T. J., & Vickers, K. (2016). Indecisiveness as a predictor
of quality of life in individuals with obsessive and compulsive traits. Journal of
Obsessive-Compulsive and Related Disorders, 30, 91-98.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jocrd.2016.07.002

104

Thompson, R. J., Spectre, A., Insel, P. S., Mennin, D., Gotlib, I. H. & Gruber, J. (2017). Positive
and negative affective forecasting in remitted individuals with bipolar I disorder, and
major depressive disorder, and healthy controls. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 41,
673-685. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10608-017-9840-2
Treadway, M. T., Bossaler, N. A., Shelton, R. C., & Zald, D. H. (2012). Effort-based decisionmaking in major depressive disorder: A translational model of motivational anhedonia.
Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 121, 553-558. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0028813
Treadway, M. T., & Zald, D. H. (2011). Reconsidering anhedonia in depression: Lessons from
translational neuroscience. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 35, 537-555.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2010.06.006
Trew, J. L. (2011). Exploring the roles of approach and avoidance in depression: An integrative
model. Clinical Psychology Review, 31, 1156-1168.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cpr.2011.07.007
Uher, R., Perlis, R. H., Henigsberg, N., Zobel, A., Rietschel, M., Mors, O., Hauser, J.,
Dernovsek, M. Z., Souery, D., Bajs, M., Maier, W., Aitchison, K. J., Farmer, A., &
McGuffin, P. (2012). Depression symptom dimensions as predictors of antidepressant
treatment outcome: Replicable evidence for interest-activity symptoms. Psychological
Medicine, 42, 967-980. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0033291711001905
Umeh, K., & Omari-Asor, L. (2011). Emotional vulnerability and coping styles for resolving
decisional conflict. The Journal of Psychology, 145, 297-312.
https://doi.org/10.1080/00223980.2011.565381

105

van Randenborgh, A., de Jong-Meyer, R., & Hüffmeier, J. (2010). Rumination fosters indecision
in dysphoria. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 66, 229-248.
https://doi.org/10.1002/jclp.20647
Wenze, S. J., Gunthert, K. C., & German, R. E. (2012). Biases in affective forecasting and recall
in individuals with depression and anxiety symptoms. Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 38, 895-906. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0146167212447242
Weschler, D. (1997). Weschler Adult Intelligence Scale (3rd ed.). San Antonio, TX: The
Psychological Corporation.
Wilson, T. D., & Gilbert, D. T. (2003). Affective forecasting. Advances in Experimental Social
Psychology, 35, 345-411. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2601(03)01006-2
Wu, H., Mata, J., Furman, D. J., Whitmer, A. J., Gotlib, I. H., & Thompson, R. J. (2017).
Anticipatory and consummatory pleasure and displeasure in major depressive disorder:
An experience sampling study. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 126, 149-159.
http://dx.doi/org/10.1037/abn0000244
Yang, X. H., Huang, J., Lan, Y., Zhu, C. Y., Liu, X. Q., Wang, Y. F., Cheung, E. F., Xie, G. R.,
& Chan, R. C. (2016). Diminished caudate and superior temporal gyrus responses to
effort-based decision-making in patients with first-episode major depressive disorder.
Progress in Neuro-Psychopharmacology & Biological Psychiatry, 64, 52-59.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pnpbp.2015.07.006
Yang, X., Huang, J., Zhu, C., Wang, Y., Cheung, E. F. C., Chan, R. C. K., & Xie, G. (2014).
Motivational deficits in effort-based decision-making in individuals with subsyndromal
depression, first-episode and remitted depression patients. Psychiatry Research, 220,
874-882. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psychres.2014.08.056

106

Zetsche, U., Bürkner, P., & Renneberg, B. (2019). Future expectations in clinical depression:
Biased or realistic? Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 128, 678-688.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/abn0000452

107

Footnotes
When the Aim 2 model was separately run in the ProA group, it resulted in an error
involving the Interpersonal Problems lower-order factor of Depression. The error was likely due
to this factor being under-identified, as it only has two indicators from the CES-D (items 15 and
19). Constraining these two indicators to be equal allowed the ProA model to run successfully.
The constraint was also added to the Aim 2 model for the MTurk group to keep the models
between the two groups parallel, as well as to the model for the simultaneous test of equal form.
1

Group differences in expected affect difference for anticipated decisions were explored,
by replacing expected affect level with expected affect difference in Model 1. ICCs from the
unconditional models revealed that 16.0% of the variance in expected PA difference, and 12.4%
of the variance in expected NA difference, was at the between-person level. The majority of the
variance at the within-person level highlights the role of context (i.e., the anticipated decision
situation) in determining how similar or different decision options were from each other.
Mean expected PA difference for the healthy control group was significantly different
from zero, 00 = 2.38, SE = 0.14, t(211) = 17.04, p < .001 (mean expected PA differences for the
depressed groups were also significantly different from zero, ts(211) > 11.60, ps < .001). The
remitted and current depressed groups did not differ in expected PA difference from the healthy
control group, 01 = 0.36, SE = 0.20, t(211) = 1.80, p = .07, and 02 = -0.22, SE = 0.23, t(211) = 0.94, p = .35, respectively. However, the current depressed group had lower expected PA
difference than did the remitted depressed group, 01 = -0.58, SE = 0.23, t(211) = -2.46, p = .02.
Mean expected NA difference for the healthy control group was significantly different
from zero, 00 = 1.69, SE = 0.11, t(211) = 15.60, p < .001 (mean expected NA differences for the
depressed groups were also significantly different from zero, ts(211) > 13.41, ps < .001). The
remitted depressed group had a higher expected NA difference than did the healthy control
group, 01 = 0.38, SE = 0.15, t(211) = 2.47, p = .01. There were no significant differences in
expected NA difference between current depressed and healthy control groups or between the
current and remitted depressed groups, 02 = 0.25, SE = 0.18, t(211) = 1.39, p = .16, and 01 =
0.13, SE = 0.18, t(211) = 0.71, p = .48, respectively.
2
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Table 1
Summary of Decision-Making Findings on Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) in Hallenbeck &
Thompson (2019)
Decision-Making Area
Indecisiveness
Decision-Making Under Uncertainty
Risk
Ambiguity
Intertemporal Choice
Social Decision-Making
Fairness
Reciprocity
Trust
Evaluation
Effort-Based Decision-Making

Finding for MDD

Same for Depressive
Symptoms?

Increased indecisiveness

Yes

Mixed (risk-averse or null effect)
Null effect during model-free RL
Reduced accuracy during model-based RL
Higher discounting

Yes
Yes
Yes
No (null effect)

Mixed (mostly null effect)
Less cooperation
Null effect for trusting others
Higher trustworthiness
Better evaluation
Reduced effort

Yes
Yes
Yes
Unknown
Unknown
Yes

Note. MDD = major depressive disorder; RL = reinforcement learning. Findings in bold reflect
decision-making difficulty.
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Table 2
Demographic Characteristics for Study 1 Participants
Variable
Age (M, SD)
Gender (% men)**
Race/Ethnicity**
Asian/Asian American
Black/African American
Caucasian
Hispanic/Latinx
Native American/Alaskan Native
Other/Multiracial
Education*
High school or lower
Some college
Bachelor’s degree
Graduate/Professional degree
Income (M, SD)

MTurk Sample
(n = 301)
35.18 (10.24)
55.8%a
3.3%a
14.6%a
78.7%a
14.3%a
1.3%a
2.0%a
9.0%a
20.3%a
48.0%a
22.7%a
69,471 (86,518)

ProA Sample
(n = 301)
35.70 (11.71)
44.7%b
5.0%a
6.7%b
80.3%a
11.0%a
1.7%a
6.4%b
12.3%a
28.9%b
43.2%a
15.6%b
61,468 (52,103)

Total Sample
(n = 602)
35.44 (10.99)
50.2%
4.2%
10.7%
79.5%
12.6%
1.5%
4.2%
10.7%
24.6%
45.6%
19.1%
65,470 (71,468)

Note. MTurk = Mechanical Turk; ProA = Prolific Academic. Difference tests were run for
comparisons between MTurk and ProA samples; values in the same row that do not share
superscripts differ at p < .05.
* p < .05.

** p < .01.
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Table 3
Items from Indecisiveness Scales and Their Factor Loadings for the Two-Factor and Three-Factor Models (and Corresponding Bifactor Models)
in Study 1
Two-Factor Model
Three-Factor Model
Item

Aversive

Revised Indecisiveness Scale (Rassin et al., 2007)
1. I try to put off making decisions.
2. I always know exactly what I want.*
3. I find it easy to make decisions.*a
4. I like to be in a position to make decisions.*
5. Once I make a decision, I feel fairly confident that it is a good one.*
6. I usually make decisions quickly.*b
7. Once I make a decision, I stop worrying about it.*c
8. I become anxious when making a decision.
9. I often worry about making the wrong decision.
10. After I have chosen or decided something, I often believe I’ve made
the wrong choice or decision.d
11. It seems that deciding on the most trivial thing takes me a long time.
Indecisiveness Scale (Germeijs & De Boeck, 2002)
1. I find it easy to make decisions.*a
2. It is hard for me to come to a decision.
3. I don't know how to make decisions.
4. I know which steps to take when making a decision.*
5. I would characterize myself as an indecisive person.
6. I don't hesitate much when I have to make a decision.*
7. While making a decision, I feel certain.*
8. While making a decision, I feel uncertain.
9. It takes me a long time to weigh pros and cons before making a
decision.
10. I make decisions quickly.*b
11. I delay deciding.
12. I don't postpone making decisions to a later date.*
13. I try to avoid making a decision.
14. I don't avoid situations where decisions have to be made.*
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Avoidant
X
X
X
X

Cognitive Affective Behavioral
X
X
X
X

X

X
X

X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X

X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

15. I tend to leave decisions to someone else.
16. I cut the knot myself in a decision instead of leaving the decision to
others.*
17. Once I have taken a decision, I stick to that decision.*
18. I often reconsider my decision.
19. Once I have made a decision, I stop worrying about it.*c
20. After making a decision, I can't get it out of my mind.
21. After I have decided something, I believe I took the wrong decision.d
22. After making a decision, I don't regret the decision.*

X
X
X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X

Note. Items with an asterisk are reverse-scored. Items that share the same superscripts have identical or very similar wording; the error variances
for these items were allowed to correlate in the CFA models. For the revised Indecisiveness Scale, the item designations for the two-factor model
(i.e., with the aversive and avoidant factors) are based on the CFA from Spunt et al. (2009); the other item designations have not been tested
previously and were tested for the first time in Study 1.
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Table 4
Mean Composite Scores and Standard Deviations for Measures in Study 1
Measure
Revised IS-FS (Indecisiveness)*
IS-GDB (Indecisiveness)
Depression*
Indecision Task
Decision-Making Difficulty
Role Decision
Task Decision
Reward Decision
Aversive Stimulus Decision
Average Across Decisions***
Decision-Making Confidence
Role Decision
Task Decision
Reward Decision
Aversive Stimulus Decision
Average Across Decisions*
Decision-Making Time (in sec)
Role Decision
Task Decision
Reward Decision
Aversive Stimulus Decision
Average Across Decisions***
Verbal IQ***

MTurk Sample
(n = 301)
29.10 (8.16)
51.29 (24.52)
20.08 (14.25)

ProA Sample
(n = 301)
30.85 (9.38)
53.54 (25.93)
17.48 (12.87)

Total Sample
(n = 602)
29.97 (8.82)
52.42 (25.24)
18.78 (13.63)

3.52 (1.96)
3.50 (1.89)
2.73 (1.88)
3.48 (2.01)
3.31 (1.63)

2.92 (1.76)
2.97 (1.76)
1.84 (1.44)
2.72 (1.93)
2.61 (1.15)

3.22 (1.88)a
3.24 (1.84)a
2.29 (1.73)b
3.10 (2.01)a
2.96 (1.45)

5.64 (1.06)
5.53 (1.08)
6.10 (1.02)
5.59 (1.26)
5.72 (0.90)

5.19 (1.34)
5.11 (1.48)
6.26 (1.09)
5.54 (1.48)
5.52 (1.04)

5.41 (1.23)a
5.32 (1.31)a
6.18 (1.06)b
5.57 (1.38)c
5.62 (0.98)

21.91 (28.48)
25.30 (29.06)
11.00 (12.71)
17.14 (32.95)
18.84 (17.50)
30.49 (9.43)

32.91 (36.14)
40.21 (46.77)
14.59 (21.68)
24.11 (26.19)
27.95 (26.62)
35.36 (6.80)

27.41 (32.98)a
32.76 (39.61)b
12.79 (17.85)c
20.62 (29.94)d
23.40 (22.97)
33.19 (8.42)

Note. MTurk = Mechanical Turk; ProA = Prolific Academic. IS-FS = Indecisiveness Scale, Frost
and Shows; IS-GDB = Indecisiveness Scale, Germeijs and De Boeck.
Difference tests were run for comparisons between MTurk and ProA samples; for the indecision
task outcomes (i.e., decision-making difficulty, confidence, and time), difference tests were run
for the average across decisions only.
In the total sample, for the indecision task, decision situation was examined as a predictor of
decision-making difficulty, confidence, and time; values in the same column section that do not
share superscripts differ at p < .05.
* p < .05. *** p < .001.
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Table 5
Model Fit Indices for Indecisiveness Measurement Model in Study 1, Aim 1
Model
Initially Planned Models
(1) One-Factor Model
(2) Two-Factor Model (Aversive,
Avoidant)
(3) Three-Factor Model (Cognitive,
Affective, Behavioral)
(4) Bifactor Version of Two-Factor
Model (Aversive, Avoidant)
(5) Bifactor Version of Three-Factor
Model (Cognitive, Affective,
Behavioral)
(6) Bifactor Model with Two
Questionnaire Factors (Revised IS-FS,
IS-GDB)
Bifactor Model with Two WordingRelated Factors (Straightforwardly
Worded, Reverse-Scored
Additional Exploratory Models
Bifactor Model with One WordingRelated Factor (Reverse-Scored)
Two-Factor Model (Straightforwardly
Worded, Reverse-Scored)

χ²

CFI

TLI

RMSEA

SRMR

9301.79
9289.31

.73
.73

.70
.70

.17
.17

.12
.12

9266.14

.73

.70

.17

.12

7641.66

.78

.74

.16

.09

8541.74

.75

.71

.17

.10

6211.28

.82

.79

.14

.08

2429.07

.94

.93

.09

.04

2973.84

.92

.91

.09

.05

2980.68

.92

.92

.09

.05

Note. CFI = Comparative Fit Index; TLI = Tucker-Lewis Incremental Fit Index; RMSEA = Root
Mean Square of Approximation; SRMR = Standardized Root Mean Residual. IS-FS =
Indecisiveness Scale, Frost and Shows; IS-GDB = Indecisiveness Scale, Germeijs and De Boeck.
All χ² values for test of model fit were statistically significant at p < .001. Values in bold indicate
at least acceptable model fit based on goodness-of-fit guidelines.
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Table 6
Indecisiveness Bifactor Model with Two Wording-Related Factors (Straightforwardly Worded, Reverse-Scored) in Study 1, Aim 1
General Factor
Item
Straightforwardly Worded Specific Factor
FS1. I try to put off making decisions.
FS8. I become anxious when making a decision.
FS9. I often worry about making the wrong decision.
FS10. After I have chosen or decided something, I often believe I’ve made the
wrong choice or decision.a
FS11. It seems that deciding on the most trivial thing takes me a long time.
GDB2. It is hard for me to come to a decision.
GDB3. I don't know how to make decisions.
GDB5. I would characterize myself as an indecisive person.
GDB8. While making a decision, I feel uncertain.
GDB9. It takes me a long time to weigh pros and cons before making a decision.
GDB11. I delay deciding.
GDB13. I try to avoid making a decision.
GDB15. I tend to leave decisions to someone else.
GDB18. I often reconsider my decision.
GDB20. After making a decision, I can't get it out of my mind.
GDB21. After I have decided something, I believe I took the wrong decision.a
Reverse-Scored Specific Factor
FS2. I always know exactly what I want.
FS3. I find it easy to make decisions.b
FS4. I like to be in a position to make decisions.
FS5. Once I make a decision, I feel fairly confident that it is a good one.
FS6. I usually make decisions quickly.c
FS7. Once I make a decision, I stop worrying about it.d
GDB1. I find it easy to make decisions.b
GDB4. I know which steps to take when making a decision.
GDB6. I don't hesitate much when I have to make a decision.
GDB7. While making a decision, I feel certain.
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Specific Factor

Factor
Loading

SE

Factor
Loading

SE

.69
.82
.80
.61

.03
.02
.02
.03

.40
.18
.18
.50

.04
.04
.04
.04

.65
.76
.44
.72
.77
.64
.75
.70
.66
.66
.60
.60

.03
.02
.04
.03
.02
.03
.02
.03
.03
.03
.03
.03

.48
.43
.78
.50
.45
.36
.42
.51
.55
.44
.54
.62

.04
.03
.04
.03
.03
.04
.04
.03
.03
.04
.03
.03

-.32
-.55
-.45
-.57
-.42
-.46
-.71
-.46
-.56
-.63

.04
.03
.04
.03
.04
.03
.02
.03
.03
.03

.64
.62
.49
.40
.59
.53
.48
.32
.64
.55

.02
.02
.03
.03
.03
.03
.03
.03
.02
.02

GDB10. I make decisions quickly.c
GDB12. I don't postpone making decisions to a later date.
GDB14. I don't avoid situations where decisions have to be made.
GDB16. I cut the knot myself in a decision instead of leaving the decision to
others.
GDB17. Once I have taken a decision, I stick to that decision.
GDB19. Once I have made a decision, I stop worrying about it.d
GDB22. After making a decision, I don't regret the decision.

-.47
-.45
-.57
-.43

.03
.03
.03
.03

.55
.60
.45
.52

.03
.02
.03
.02

-.47
-.51
-.50

.03
.03
.03

.46
.52
.58

.03
.02
.02

Note. Factor loadings are standardized, and all were significant at p < .001. The specific factor column refers to either the Straightforwardly
Worded Factor or the Reverse-Scored Factor, depending on the item. Items loading onto the Reverse-Scored Factor were not reverse-scored prior
to the CFA. Items that share the same superscripts have identical or very similar wording; the error variances for these items were allowed to
correlate in the CFA model. FS = Indecisiveness Scale, Frost and Shows; GDB = Indecisiveness Scale, Germeijs and De Boeck.
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Table 7
Demographic and Clinical Characteristics by Group for Study 2 Participants

Age (M, SD)
Gender (% women)
Race/Ethnicity
Asian or Asian American
Black or African American
Caucasian
Native American or Alaskan Native
Other/Multiracial
Hispanic/Latinx
Current anxiety disorder***

Healthy
Control
Group
(n = 87)
45.4 (16.9)
57.5%

Remitted
Depressed
Group
(n = 80)
44.3 (16.3)
71.3%

4.6%
19.5%
66.7%
1.1%
8.0%
1.1%
0%a

0%
18.8%
72.5%
0%
7.5%
2.5%
18.8%b

Note. Values in the same row that do not share superscripts differ at p < .01.
*** p < .001.
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Current
Depressed
Group
(n = 48)
42.0 (14.2)
72.9%
4.2%
20.8%
70.8%
0%
4.2%
0%
70.8%c

Table 8
Within- and Between-Person Correlations among Expected Affect Variables by Group in Study 2
Variable
Healthy Control Group:
1. Expected PA Mean Level
2. Expected NA Mean Level
3. Expected PA Difference
4. Expected NA Difference
Remitted Depressed Group:
1. Expected PA Mean Level
2. Expected NA Mean Level
3. Expected PA Difference
4. Expected NA Difference
Current Depressed Group:
1. Expected PA Mean Level
2. Expected NA Mean Level
3. Expected PA Difference
4. Expected NA Difference

1

2

3

4

--.54***
-.22*
.30**

.33**
---.26*
.32**

-.52***
.13
--.27*

-.11*
.28**
.35***
---

--.35**
-.38***
.04

.33***
---.04
.35**

-.51***
-.08
--.46***

-.10
.30*
.18***
---

--.32*
-.51***
-.10

.40**
---.12
.26+

-.48***
-.25
--.34*

-.03
-.23
.21*
---

Note. Correlations above the diagonal are within-person correlations obtained from MLM
analyses (Nezlek, 2012). Correlations below the diagonal are between-person correlations
calculated using aggregated data.
+

p < .01. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001.
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Figure 1. Model of Decision-Making Difficulty in Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) from
Hallenbeck & Thompson (2019). NA = Negative Affect; PA = Positive Affect.
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Figure 2. Indecisiveness CFAs Tested in Study 1, Aim 1. IS = Indecisiveness Scale; FS = Frost and Shows; GDB = Germeijs & De
Boeck.The actual number of IS indicators (in boxes) in each model is 33; not all IS indicators are shown due to space limitations. For
the breakdown of how specific IS indicators load onto different factors, refer to Table 3.
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Figure 3. CFA Tested in Study 1, Aim 2. CES-D = Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression. The actual number of CES-D
indicators (in boxes) in the model is 20; not all CES-D indicators are shown due to space limitations. Depressed Affect had CES-D
items 3, 6, 9, 10, 14, 17, and 18. Positive Affect had CES-D items 4, 8, 12, and 16. Somatic Symptoms had CES-D items 1, 2, 5, 7,
11, 13, and 20. Interpersonal Problems had CES-D items 15 and 19.
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Figure 4. CFA Findings from Study 1, Aim 2. (A) Model with Bifactor Indecisiveness - General, Straightforwardly Worded, and
Reverse-Scored Factors. (B) Model with Bifactor Indecisiveness - General and Reverse-Scored Factors. (C) Model with Two-Factor
Indecisiveness – Straightforwardly Worded and Reverse-Scored Factors. All correlations are standardized and significant at ps < .001
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with the exception of one nonsignificant correlation (italicized). In all three models, items loading onto the Reverse-Scored factor
were not reverse-scored prior to the CFA. In (A) and (B), correlations between general and specific factors are set to zero, due to the
bifactor structure. Lower-order factors and indicators are omitted due to space limitations.
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Mean Levels of Expected Affect
10
all n.s.
Healthy Control

8

***
Remitted Depressed
***

6

Current Depressed

+
4

2

0

Expected PA

Expected NA

Figure 5. Mean levels of expected affect for anticipated decisions by group during EMA period
in Study 2. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
+ p < .10. *** p < .001.

125

Probability Of Decision Not Made

0.25

Expected NA Difference
0.20

High (+1 SD)
Low (−1 SD)

0.15

0.10

0.05

0.00

−8

−4

0

4

8

Expected NA Level

Figure 6. Probability of anticipated decision not made as a function of expected NA level
(person-mean centered), moderated by expected NA difference, for the healthy control group in
Study 2.
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Appendix
Decision information for indecision task in Study 1
Role Decision
1. Person A has more of a boss’s role in the partner task.
2. Person B has more of an employee's role.
3. Person A has to take notes of the work results while working on the task.
4. Person B is responsible for keeping track of time during the task.
5. Person A receives a performance-based bonus.
6. Person B receives a payment that is not based on the performance of the team.
7. Person A has the opportunity to determine the final solutions, even if Person B is against
it.
8. Person A can only hear Person B (using headphones).
9. Person B can hear and see Person A (using headphones and the webcam on the
computer).
10. Person A receives more information relevant to the task than Person B.
11. In a preliminary investigation, 57.3% of the subjects were inclined towards Role B.
12. The role of Person A requires more concentration.
13. Person B has less information, but also some information that Person A does not have.
14. Role A requires more creativity and good ideas.
15. Role B will probably be less varied.
16. At the end of the experiment, Person A receives detailed feedback on his or her work
performance.
17. Role B requires diligence and precision.
18. Person A is prohibited from knowing what time it is during the task.
19. After the partner task, Person B needs to write a short report on the process of finding the
joint solution.
20. Person A must be alone during the task.
21. Person B can have other people in the room during the task.
22. Person A is only allowed to use pen and paper.
23. Person B is allowed various aids which the team can use (paper, pencil, calculator, and
clock).
24. The information Person A receives is enough to satisfactorily solve the problem.
25. The information Person B receives is not enough to satisfactorily solve the problem.
26. The experiment takes an equal amount of time for both people.
27. Person A is expected to take more responsibility for the work result.
28. The computer display for Person B is bigger and brighter.
29. Person A will use a newer software program for the task.
30. Person B usually shows some moderate physiological reactions.
Task Decision
1. Task A is about a manager who has an overpacked work routine.
2. Task B is about a hospital where there are communication problems between various
professional groups.
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3. Your work assignment in Task A is to develop a plan for how the manager could
structure his workday to be less stressful but still efficient.
4. Your work assignment in Task B is to find ways for efficiently managing the flow of
information between employees.
5. In Task A, prior knowledge of workflow in companies is advantageous.
6. In Task B, prior knowledge of healthcare organizations is advantageous.
7. The information relevant to Task A is in a report (a sound recording) submitted by the
manager on his situation.
8. The information relevant to Task B is available in three formats: 1. Tables on the tasks of
the various professional groups; 2. A list of regular meetings and communication
channels used; 3. Two letters of complaint received by the clinic management.
9. The manager’s difficulties in his work life in Task A also impact his private life. This
should be considered.
10. In Task B, you should take the perspective of a chief physician, who is in charge of
taking the appropriate actions.
11. In Task A, the report can only be listened to once (therefore a good memory is
beneficial).
12. In Task B, the nursing staff in particular seem very dissatisfied.
13. The information from the manager’s report in Task A is somewhat disordered and partly
confusing.
14. In Task B, the informational materials are available throughout the task.
15. The plan developed in Task A should be presented in the form of a formulated report, in
response to the manager’s report.
16. In Task B, the results should be noted in bullet point form, with a short explanation.
17. Skills useful for Task A: A good feel for time management, ability to set priorities,
empathy for the manager’s various burdens.
18. Skills useful for Task B: Talent in the design of communication structures, ability to
think in a networked way.
19. Further information about the manager in Task A: 36 years old, male, single.
20. In Task B, you only have a certain budget for the material costs for the restructuring
plans.
21. More information about the manager’s personality in Task A: introverted, ambitious,
hardworking, disorganized.
22. The hospital in Task B is a children’s hospital.
23. The manager in Task A works in sales.
24. The involved professional groups in Task B are the nursing staff, teachers, caretakers,
and doctors.
25. The manager’s company in Task A manufactures electronic devices.
26. The hospital in Task B has 215 beds.
27. The company in Task A is a mid-sized family-run business.
28. The hospital in Task B serves a small town and a larger rural area.
29. The company in Task A is in San Antonio.
30. The hospital in Task B is located in the Midwest.
Reward Decision
1. A gift card for Target.
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2.
3.
4.
5.

A gift card for Walmart.
The gift card for Target is valid for half a year.
The gift card for Walmart is valid for two years.
Target has been described to rely on the strategy of marketing to “the needs of its
younger, image-conscious shoppers.”
6. Walmart has been described to rely on the strategy of having “always low prices.”
7. Target operates 1,850 stores in the United States.
8. Walmart operates 5,355 stores in the United States.
9. Target frequently partners with upscale designers to offer trend-forward merchandise.
10. Walmart tends to offer a large selection of produce and automobile items (e.g., tires).
11. Target stores are designed to be more attractive than its competitors, by having wider
aisles, drop ceilings, and generally cleaner fixtures.
12. Walmart stores are designed not to have frills which helps to save customers money.
13. Target offers free, two-day shipping for online orders over $35 or for orders purchased
with the Target credit card.
14. Walmart offers free, two-day shipping for online orders over $35.
15. Target offers store pick-up for purchases made online; when products are available for
pick-up depends on the product.
16. Walmart offers store pick-up for purchases made online; many products are available
within four hours for pick-up.
17. Target offers same-day grocery delivery services for $9.99 per order or for unlimited
orders as part of an annual plan with a fee of $99.
18. Walmart offers same-day grocery delivery services for $9.95 per order.
19. Target’s credit card allows customers to save 5% on Target purchases, in-store and
online.
20. Walmart’s credit card allows customers to save 3% on Walmart online purchases, 2% on
Walmart gas purchases, and 1% on all other purchases.
21. Target offers a subscription service (i.e., products delivered on a schedule, usually at a
discount) for everyday essentials.
22. Walmart offers a subscription service (i.e., products delivered on a schedule, usually at a
discount) for beauty products.
23. Target has in-store, electronic (i.e., delivered via email), and mobile (i.e., delivered via
text message) gift cards available for purchase.
24. Walmart has in-store and electronic (i.e., delivered via email) gift cards available for
purchase.
25. Target offers $11/hour minimum wage for its employees and has pledged to raise
minimum wage to $15/hour by 2020.
26. Walmart offers $11/hour minimum wage for its employees.
27. The headquarters of Target are located in Minneapolis, Minnesota.
28. The headquarters of Walmart are located in Bentonville, Arkansas.
29. The founder of Target is George Dayton.
30. The founder of Walmart is Sam Walton.
Aversive Stimulus Decision
1. The sound will be transmitted through headphones.
2. The picture will be displayed full screen on your computer display.
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3. The sound will be unpleasantly loud at 95 db.
4. The nature of the unpleasant picture will be violent and gruesome.
5. Aside from the loudness, the nature of the sound is also unpleasant, which most people
describe as “squeaky” or “shrill.”
6. About 3% of people do not find the picture unpleasant.
7. The sound, at 10 seconds long, will be the shorter of the two unpleasant stimuli.
8. The picture will be displayed for 20 seconds, during which you are required to look at the
screen.
9. Research shows that 52% of participants, given this choice, are more likely to pick the
unpleasant sound.
10. The picture has been tested in the laboratory for its harmlessness.
11. In general, women find the sound more unpleasant than men do.
12. In extremely rare cases (about 0.5%) a feeling of nausea lasts for a few minutes after the
picture is displayed.
13. The sound is not intense enough to trigger a headache.
14. For reasons unknown, for a few people (between 1-3%) the picture causes a blinding
painful side effect for few minutes.
15. A harmless but unpleasant after-sound could last for a few minutes.
16. Participants perceive the picture as more controllable than the sound.
17. The sound becomes primarily noticeable as an increase in volume.
18. The physiological reaction pattern is more pronounced for a picture than for a sound.
19. The sound cannot cause permanent damage.
20. The picture is even used in experiments with children.
21. The sound was recorded on a metal object using mechanical action.
22. The picture has been tested on various people with heart conditions and has not caused
any adverse reactions.
23. The sound was specially created for a psychological study in 1993.
24. The picture is of a mutilated human body.
25. Some people already find setting up and wearing the headphones unpleasant.
26. The mutilated human body in the picture is fake but very realistic-looking.
27. On a 6-point scale from pleasant to extremely unpleasant, the sound was rated as 5.3 (=
very unpleasant).
28. On a 6-point scale from pleasant to extremely unpleasant, the picture was rated as 5.1 (=
very unpleasant).
29. The sound swells up and down.
30. Research shows that 48% of participants, given the choice, pick the unpleasant picture.
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